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“We, the Paparazzi”: Developing a Privacy Paradigm for Digital Video
Jacqueline D. Lipton*

Abstract
In January 2009, the Camera Phone Predator Alert bill was introduced into
Congress. It raised serious concerns about privacy rights in the face of digital
video technology. In so doing, it brought to light a worrying gap in current
privacy regulation – the lack of rules relating to digital video privacy. To date,
digital privacy regulation has focused on text records that contain personal data.
Little attention has been paid to privacy in video files that may portray
individuals in inappropriate contexts, or in an unflattering or embarrassing light.
As digital video technology, including inexpensive cellphone cameras, is now
becoming widespread in the hands of the public, the regulatory focus must shift.
Once a small percentage of online content, digital video is now appearing at an
exponential rate. This is largely due to the growth of online social networking
platforms such as YouTube and Facebook. Sharing video online has become a
global phenomenon, while the lack of effective privacy protection for these
images has become a global problem. Digital video poses four distinct problems
for privacy, arising from: de-contextualization, dissemination, aggregation, and
permanency of video information. While video shares some of these attributes
with text, its unique qualities necessitate a separate study of video privacy
regulation. This article identifies a rationale for, and critiques suggested
approaches to, digital video privacy. It argues that legal regulation, without
more, is unlikely to provide necessary solutions. Instead, it advocates a new
multi-modal approach consisting of a matrix of legal rules, social norms, system
architecture, market forces, public education, and non-profit institutions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In my mind and in my car, we can't rewind we've gone too far.
Pictures came and broke your heart, put the blame on VTR.

- The Buggles, “Video Killed the Radio Star”1
Once upon a time, a passenger’s dog defecated on the floor of a subway car in
South Korea. While unremarkable in itself, this story quickly became an Internet
sensation when the passenger refused to clean the mess, even after being offered a tissue
by a fellow traveler.2 Someone on the train, an anonymous face in the crowd, took photos
of the woman with a cellphone camera. These images were promptly posted on a popular
Korean blog. The aim was to shame the unrepentant and socially irresponsible dog
owner.3 Ultimately, the humiliation attached to this incident resulted in a firestorm of
criticism that caused her to quit her job.4 This story is one of a number of recent episodes
illustrating how a person’s privacy can be destroyed at the push of a button, using the
simplest and most ubiquitous combination of digital technologies – the cellphone camera
and the Internet.5 Another salient example of this phenomenon involved “Star Wars kid”
– a Canadian teenager who filmed himself playing with a golf ball retriever as if it was a
light-saber from the Star Wars movies. His video was posted to the Internet without his
authorization. It was then adopted by a variety of amateur video enthusiasts on services
such as YouTube.6 They created many popular, but extremely humiliating, mash-up
videos7 of the youth.8 The young man ended up dropping out of school. He also required
psychiatric care, including a period of institutionalization at a children’s psychiatric
facility.9
1

The Buggles, “Video Killed the Radio Star” (song lyrics), available at
http://www.lyricsondemand.com/onehitwonders/videokilledtheradiostarlyrics.html, last viewed on May 14,
2008.
2
JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT, 211 (2008).
3
DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET,
1 (2007) [hereinafter, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION].
4
ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 211.
5
id., at 99 (“One holder of a mobile phone camera can irrevocably compromise someone else’s
privacy …”). On camera phones in particular, see discussion in Alan Kato Ku, Talk is Cheap, But a
Picture is Worth a Thousand Words: Privacy Rights in the Era of Camera Phone Technology, 45 SANTA
CLARA L REV 679 (2005)
6
See www.youtube.com, last viewed on September 29, 2008.
7
Wikipedia currently defines a “mashup” as “a digital media file containing any or all of text,
graphics, audio, video and animation drawn from pre-existing sources, to create a new derivative work”:
Wikipedia definition of “digital mashup”, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mashup_(digital), last
viewed on September 29, 2008.
8
ZITTRAIN, supra note __, at 211 (discussion of “Star Wars kid” scenario); SOLOVE, THE FUTURE
OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 43-48 (discussion of “Star Wars Kid” example of a video-based privacy
invasion that harmed an individual’s reputation and caused ongoing harm to him in the real world).
9
Wired News Report, Star Wars Kid Files Lawsuit, July 24, 2003, WIRED, available at
http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/news/2003/07/59757, last viewed on July 23, 2008 (“Ghyslain was
so teased about the video, he dropped out of school and finished the semester at a children's psychiatric
ward, according to a lawsuit filed in the Raza's hometown of Trois-Rivières, Quebec.”); ZITTRAIN, supra
note ___, at 212 (“The student who made the [Star Wars kid] video has been reported to have been
traumatized by its circulation…”).
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If these episodes are not enough to raise the specter of serious harm, consider the
fate of “Bus Uncle” in Hong Kong. This man was physically assaulted in a targeted
attack at the restaurant where he worked. The attack ensued after online posting of a
video depicting him speaking loudly on his cellphone on a bus and ignoring requests of
other passengers to be quiet.10 Video privacy concerns have not gone unnoticed by
Congress: for example, the Camera Phone Predator Alert bill,11 introduced in January
2009, aims to allay fears about the exploitation of the public12 through inappropriate and
unauthorized cellphone photography.13 The bill would require all cellphones to make an
audible sound when taking a photograph to alert potential subjects that they may have
been captured in a digital video file that could later be posted online.14
We are witnessing the emergence of a worrying new trend: peers15 intruding into
each other’s privacy and anonymity with video and multi-media files in ways that harm
the subjects of the digital files.16 There is a mismatch between these harms and available
legal remedies, notably those arising out of privacy and defamation law.17 Even new laws
10

ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 211 (“The famed “Bus Uncle” of Hong Kong upbraided a fellow bus
passenger who politely asked him to speak more quietly on his mobile phone. The mobile phone user
learned an important lesson in etiquette when a third person captured the argument and then uploaded it to
the Internet, where 1.3 million people have viewed one version of the exchange …. Weeks after the video
was posted, the Bus Uncle was beaten up in a targeted attack at the restaurant where he worked.”)
11
H.R. 414 (111th Cong., 2009).
12
In this respect, it focuses on children and adolescents: Camera Phone Predator Alert bill, H.R. 414
(111th Cong., 2009), § 2 (“Congress finds that children and adolescents have been exploited by photographs
taken in dressing rooms and public places with the use of a camera phone.”)
13
See Priya Ganapati, New Bill Asks For Cameraphones to Go Clickety Clack, Wired Blog Network
(Jan. 26, 2009) (available at http://blog.wired.com/gadgets/2009/01/new-bill-asks-f.html, last viewed on
January 27, 2009).
14
Camera Phone Predator Alert bill H.R. 414 (111th Cong., 2009), § 3(a) (“Beginning 1 year after
the date of enactment of this Act, any mobile phone containing a digital camera that is manufactured for
sale in the United States shall sound a tone or other sound audible within a reasonable radius of the phone
whenever a photograph is taken with the camera in such phone. A mobile phone manufactured after such
date shall not be equipped with a means of disabling or silencing such tone or sound.”) In fact, such a law
already exists in Japan: Ganapati, supra note ___ (“Japan already requires all cameraphones including the
iPhone to make an audible noise when taking a photograph.”)
15
In this context I use the term “peers” in a broad sense, referring to members of society with equal
access to each other via cellphone pictures and day-to-day interactions. Unless the context otherwise
requires, the term is not intended to connate particularly close personal relationships.
16
See also Andrew McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through
Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L REV 887, 927 (2006) (“[T]echnology has made it much
easier for people to take embarrassing pictures of others, both with and without consent, and to widely
disseminate them via the Internet.”); 928 (“Digital cameras and camcorders are specifically designed to be
connected to computers and to deliver pictures across worldwide networks in an instant.”); ZITTRAIN, supra
note ___, at 221 (“The central problem [for regulating privacy on the Internet] is that the organizations
creating, maintaining, using, and disseminating records of identifiable personal data are no longer just
“organizations” – they are people who take pictures and stream them online, who blog about their reactions
to a lecture or a class or a meal, and who share on social sites rich descriptions of their friends and
interactions.”)
17
Existing privacy torts generally do not extend to activities in public places, even where one would
assume the video subject had some expectation of privacy or anonymity: see discussion in Part II.A.2
infra. Defamation law will not sanction the publication of truthful material. A “defamatory” statement is
a false statement that potentially harms a person’s reputation: Arlen Langvardt, Section 43(a), Commercial
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such as the proposed Camera Phone Predator Alert bill would only notify a person that a
picture of her may have been taken. It would do nothing to stem the tide of global online
dissemination of a damaging image of a person. While it is now trite to say that the
Internet poses significant risks to privacy, these risks have previously manifested
themselves in the collection, use, and dissemination of text-based personal records by
governments,18 businesses,19 health care providers,20 Internet intermediaries,21 and
prospective employers.22 Today, we need to add concerns about unauthorized uses of our
personal information by our peers over networks such as MySpace,23 Facebook,24 Flickr,25
and Youtube,26 much of it in video formats.27 An image of an individual in an

Falsehood, and the First Amendment: A Proposed Framework, 78 MINN. L. REV 309, 334 (1993) (“The
common law defines defamation as the publication of a false and defamatory statement about the plaintiff.
Defamatory statements, by definition, tend to harm the plaintiff's reputation.”).
18
Professor Solove has, in fact, devoted a large part of a book to these issues: Solove, THE DIGITAL
PERSON, Part III: Government Access (2004) [hereinafter, THE DIGITAL PERSON]
19
id., at 4 (“Computers enable marketers to collect detailed dossiers of personal information and to
analyze it to predict the consumer’s behavior. Through various analytic techniques, marketers construct
models of what products particular customers will desire and how to encourage customers to consume.
Companies know how we spend our money, what we do for a living, how much we earn, and where we
live. They know about our ethnic backgrounds, religion, political views, and health problems. Not only do
companies know what we have already purchased, but they also have a good idea about what books we will
soon buy or what movies we will want to see.”)
20
See, for example, Sharona Hoffman and Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace:
Protecting the Security Of Electronic Private Health Information, 48 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 331
(2007); Patricia Sánchez Abril and Anita Cava, Health Privacy in a Techno-Social World: A CyberPatient’s Bill of Rights, 6 NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 244
(2008).
21
See, for example, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Privacy? Proposed Google/Doubleclick
Deal, available at http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/ , last viewed on July 21, 2008 (expressing concern
about ability of Internet intermediaries such as search engine Google and Internet advertising firm
Doubleclick to monitor users’ online behavior in the context of proposed merger negotiations between
Google and Doubleclick).
22
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 203 (discussing employers’ practices
with respect to ascertaining and using online information about prospective hires).
23
MySpace is a social networking service where individuals can search for and communicate with
old and new friends: see www.myspace.com, last viewed on July 22, 2008.
24
Facebook describes itself as a “social utility that connects you with the people around you.”:
www.facebook.com, last viewed on July 22, 2008.
25
Flickr describes itself as “almost certainly the best online photo management and sharing
application in the world”: www.flickr.com, last viewed on July 22, 2008.
26
YouTube is an online file sharing service for video files: www.youtube.com, last viewed on July
22, 2008. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 40 (“Anybody can post videos of
anybody else on YouTube. People can post pictures of you or write about you in their blogs. Even if you
aren’t exhibiting your private life online, it may still wind up being exposed by somebody else.”)
27
Throughout this article, “video” refers collectively to still images and multi-media video files.
While I recognize there are important qualitative differences between these kinds of files, the aim of this
Article is to draw a line between text-based privacy incursions, and those incursions that involve different
kinds of media. In later work, I hope to draw more subtle distinctions between different non-text formats
for online information. See ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 221 (noting that new threats to privacy online
arise from peer based multimedia content being disseminated on the Internet, as opposed to the traditional
threats where organizations collated text based data about private individuals).
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embarrassing situation might well affect her chances of employment,28 education, or
health insurance.29 As in the examples of “Star Wars kid”, “dog poop girl”, and “Bus
Uncle”, the consequences of such unauthorized dissemination can be devastating.
Video images are qualitatively different from text-based data in a variety of
ways.30 Nevertheless, most privacy literature fails to acknowledge that fact. This Article
focuses on how best to protect video privacy in an age of online social networking. This
issue must be considered urgently by law and policy makers to avoid the entrenchment of
privacy-destroying norms when online social networking (OSN) technologies reach a
critical mass point.31 This Article argues that legal regulation alone is unlikely to solve
society’s video privacy problems.32 It advocates a multi-modal approach that combines
six regulatory modalities: legal rules, social norms,33 system architecture,34 market
forces,35 public education, and private/non-profit institutions.36 Part II identifies gaps in
privacy law with respect to online video privacy. It notes that, current tort laws are illsuited to the digital age, and are globally disharmonized. Part III identifies practical and
28

SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 38 (“Employers are looking at social
network site profiles of prospective employees. Microsoft officials admit to trolling the Internet for
anything they can find out about people they are considering for positions.”)
29
id. On the other hand, there is some suggestion that the widespread availability of personal
information online cannot be stopped and might actually be beneficial to society. See, for example, Lior
Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NORTHWESTERN
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, forthcoming, October 2008 (arguing that basing decisions on real information
rather than dangerous and discriminatory proxies such as race actually provides social benefits overall)
[hereinafter, Reputation Nation]
30
JON MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT, 35-37 (2008) (noting the importance of recognizing that
information available through different modes of communication - such as text, audio tape, still images,
and video recordings – have different impacts on privacy); 238 (“courts may be more inclined to protect
against intrusive images than intrusive words”); 263 (describing British courts’ readiness to extend privacy
protections to photographs, but not to textual descriptions of particular misconduct). See also discussion in
Part II.
31
That is, of course, assume they haven’t already reached that point. See discussion in Gaia
Bernstein, When New Technologies are Still New: Windows of Opportunity for Privacy Protection, 51
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW 921 (2006) (noting importance of at least thinking about making regulatory
decisions to protect privacy interests before privacy-destroying norms become entrenched when the take-up
of the technology reaches a critical mass) [hereinafter, New Technologies].
32
JACK GOLDSMITH and TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS
WORLD, 181 (2006) (“There’s no reason to doubt that most people’s lives are dominated not by law but by
social norms, morality, and the market, or that the Internet is deeply influenced by its code.”)
33
Katherine Strandburg, Privacy, Rationality, and Temptation: A Theory of Willpower Norms, 57
RUTGERS L REV 1235,1238 (2005) (“Social norms are primarily understood as means to coordinate the
behavior of individuals in a social group. Thus, norms may help to solve coordination problems - by
determining how pedestrians pass one another on the street - and collective action problems - by
stigmatizing littering - when individually rational behavior leads to collectively undesirable results.”)
34
See discussion in Joel Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules
Through Technology, 76 TEXAS L REV 553 (1998) (describing how digital technology can be utilized as a
form of regulatory mechanism for online conduct) [hereinafter, Lex Informatica].
35
Ann Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CALIFORNIA LAW REV 1231, 1253 (2001) (“Markets constrain
behavior through price. If the price of gasoline rises dramatically, people will drive less.”)
36
These may be defined as institutions with social benefits, rather than commercial profits, as their
aim. See Neil Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEXAS L REV, forthcoming 2008 (describing the American
Libraries Association as a regulatory institution in this sense with respect to the bill of rights it developed to
protect interests of library patrons in 1939) [hereinafter, Intellectual Privacy].
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theoretical justifications for, and possible approaches to, regulating online video privacy.
Part IV sets out a framework for a new multi-modal regulatory approach based on the six
modalities identified above. Part V concludes with a discussion of future directions for
online video privacy regulation.

II. ONLINE VIDEO PRIVACY: GAPS IN THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK
New technologies are radically advancing our freedoms, but they are also enabling unparalleled
invasions of privacy.

-

Electronic Frontier Foundation37

Advances in video technologies have historically facilitated dramatic social
transformations. In the late nineteenth century, when photography first became relatively
cheap and portable,38 commentators expressed concerns about the development of the
“snap camera” by Kodak.39 This camera for the first time enabled private individuals and
members of the press to take and distribute candid photographs in a way never before
possible.40 It was also what ultimately spurred on Warren and Brandeis to publish their
seminal article on privacy.41 Their article shaped the development of American privacy
law for more than a century.42 The fact that it was derived from the authors’ concerns
about video privacy suggests something important about video that differentiates it from
other forms of information.43
Today’s online video technologies create new threats to privacy. With cellphone
cameras and the Internet, the dissemination of video – both still and multi-media - is now
37

Electronic Frontier Foundation, Privacy, available at http://www.eff.org/issues/privacy, last
viewed on May 12, 2008.
38
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 107 (“Kodak’s snap camera was cheap
and portable. Many more people could afford to own their own camera, and for the first time, candid
photos of people could be taken.”).
39
id, at 107-108.
40
Neil Richards and Daniel Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality,
96 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 123, 128-9 (2007) (describing Warren and Brandeis’ concern with
the combination of newspaper sensationalism and new photographic technology enabling more widescale
candid photography and dissemination of resulting photographs than ever before) [hereinafter, Privacy’s
Other Path]; DANIEL SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, 15 (2008) (“Warren and Brandeis were
concerned not only with new [photographic] technology but with how it would intersect with the media.
The press was highly sensationalistic at the time.”) [hereinafter, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY].
41
Samuel D Warren and Louis D Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); JON
MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT, 5 (2008) (noting that concerns about the advent of popular
photography was probably what spurred on Warren and Brandeis in writing this article).
42
DANIEL SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, 15 (2008) (“Many scholars have proclaimed Warren
and Brandeis’s article the foundation of privacy law in the United States.”); Richards and Solove, Privacy’s
Other Path, supra note ___, at 127-8 (describing Warren and Brandeis’ contribution to the privacy debate
as “Privacy’s Defining Moment” in heading “I”).
43
See also MILLS, supra note ___, at 35-37 (noting the importance of recognizing that information
available through different modes of communication - such as text, audio tape, still images, and video
recordings – have different impacts on privacy); 238 (“courts may be more inclined to protect against
intrusive images than intrusive words”); 263 (describing British courts’ readiness to extend privacy
protections to photographs, but not to textual descriptions of particular misconduct).
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practically instantaneous and potentially global in scope. The concerns about loss of
control over personal information are much greater online than even in the gossip rags of
the nineteenth century. To be published in a newspaper, albeit a scandal sheet, pictures
had to make their way into the hands of an entity that produced such a publication.
Today, anyone can be a publisher. Photographers do not even need a stand-alone camera
to capture a candid image – most people can resort to their inexpensive and ever-present
cellphones.44 The fact that individuals can instantly snap a photograph without even
thinking to carry a camera, and that they can then disseminate that image instantaneously
and globally at the push of a button, raises significant problems of decontextualization.
Compared to the individual writing a text-based account of an event and posting it online,
the video record is likely to capture more information, including more incidental
background information than might appear in a text-based record. Additionally, more
thought goes into writing the text than into thoughtlessly snapping an image. Thus, more
context is likely to be provided in a textual account of the same event.
Images and multi-media files are quite different from text, particularly as reagards
context.45 Textual data is often iterative. It tends to be aggregated over a period of time
from different sources. This provides it both some context and a greater degree of
accuracy. Concerns about digital data have focused on the way in which textual data can
represent too detailed a profile of a person online46 that is often readily available to third
parties. Nevertheless, it may take a whole collection of textual data to suggest something
that a picture candidly demonstrates in one digital file. An aggregated text profile, for
example, may include items that suggest a person is trying to become pregnant. These
data may include records involving purchase of ovulation tests, pregnancy tests,
information on pregnancy, information on in vitro fertilization (IVF), and medical
appointments with fertility specialists. However, a video image of the person entering an
IVF clinic could potentially tell the story in one glance.
Nevertheless, the image lacks context47: for example, the video subject may have
entered the IVF clinic for a variety of reasons, including to provide support to a friend
undergoing IVF treatment. Thus, the aggregated text profile may be a more accurate
reflection of a data subject’s attempts to become pregnant because it is verifiable by a set
of data collected over time from a variety of sources. Of course, it is equally possible
that the data subject could be purchasing tests and fertility information for a friend just as
easily as she could be attending an IVF clinic to provide support to a friend.
Nevertheless, in general, the aggregation of multiple data records across time and from a
variety of sources is less likely to be misinterpreted than a single image taken out of
44

See discussion in Kato Ku, supra note ___; Ganapati, supra note ___.
MILLS, supra note ___, at 35 (“Photos have a different impact than written words, and a video has
a different impact than photos, as a mode of intrusion.”), 36-37 (noting the importance of recognizing that
information available through different modes of communication - such as text, audio tape, still images,
and video recordings – have different impacts on privacy); 238 (“courts may be more inclined to protect
gainst intrusive images than intrusive words”); 263 (describing British courts’ readiness to extend privacy
protections to photographs, but not to textual descriptions of particular misconduct).
46
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 117-121.
47
Patricia Sánchez Abril, A (My)Space of One’s Own: On Privacy and Online Social Networks, 6
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 73, 75 (2007) (raising
contextualization concerns about images disseminated online) [hereinafter, (My)Space].
45
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context. The more sources and more time involved, the more accurate the data record is
likely to be.
Outside contextualization concerns, digital video poses additional problems for
online privacy: the threat of viral online distribution of private images (dissemination
problems);48 the possibility of others augmenting the images with additional information true, false, or indeterminate (aggregation problems);49 and the inability of an image
subject to ever obtain control of the information once it hits cyberspace (permanence
problems).50 These problems are highlighted below in an examination of gaps in the
current laws that protect privacy.

A. PROTECTING ONLINE PRIVACY: GAPS IN THE LAW
1. Copyright Law
While copyright law has proved extremely effective in protecting property rights
online, it is of little assistance to those seeking to protect privacy. Copyright in an image
is generally granted to the photographer, not the photographic subject.51 As the subject is
not likely to have been the photographer, copyright law will not help those attempting to
control dissemination of photographs in which they feature as subjects. Of course, in the
unusual case where the subject is the copyright owner,52 a copyright action would be
48

With respect to the viral distribution of information online generally, see SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF
REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 62 (“In the offline world, rarely does gossip hit a tipping point. The
process of spreading information to new people takes time, and friends often associate in similar circles, so
most secrets don’t spread too widely. The Internet takes this phenomenon and puts it on steroids. People
can communicate with tens of thousands – even millions – of people almost simultaneously. If you put
something up on the Internet, countless people can access it at the same time. In an instant, information
can speed across the globe.”)
49
The idea of data aggregation appears as a sub-set of the idea of information processing in
Professor Solove’s “taxonomy of privacy”. See, for example, SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra
note ___, at 118 (“Aggregation is the gathering of information about a person. A piece of information here
or there is not very telling, but when combined, bits and pieces of data begin to form a portrait of a person.
The whole becomes greater than the parts.”) Adding new information to video images might, in some
contexts, resemble a form of identification as also contemplated in Professor Solove’s taxonomy: SOLOVE,
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 123 (“Identification is similar to aggregation because both
involve the combination of different pieces of information, one being the identity of a person. However,
identification differs from aggregation in that it entails a link to the person in the flesh.”)
50
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 33 (“The Internet … makes gossip a
permanent reputational stain, one that never fades. It is available around the world, and with Google it can
be readily found in less than a second.”), 165 (citing Professor McClurg’s work suggesting that images
have a quality of permanence that memories lack in the sense that people can scrutinize an image and
notice details they might not see when observing the original situation); McClurg, supra note ___, at 928
(“[P]ersons whose private information is posted on the Internet permanently lose control over that
information and, hence, that aspect of their selves.”); ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 211 (“Lives can be
ruined after momentary wrongs, even if merely misdeameanors.”); Abril, (My)Space, supra note ___, at 75
(“Lacking the relative transience of human memory, the digital record has increased the takes of privacy
today…”).
51
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 184 (“Copyright in a photo is owned
initially by the person who takes the photo, not by the person whose photo is taken.”).
52
Either because she used a timer to take the picture or because someone else assigned copyright in
the image to her.
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available for unauthorized distribution of the video online.53 Interestingly, the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998 incorporated a notice and takedown regime
that gives an immediate right to have an image removed from a website on the basis of a
copyright infringement. However, no similar law has been enacted for intrusions into an
individual’s privacy or dignity.54

2. Privacy Torts and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Laws regulating intrusive photography are equally unlikely to help image
subjects. While some privacy torts prohibit intrusions into seclusion,55 conduct involving
OSNs will generally not attract the operation of these laws. Peer photographs are usually
taken with the consent of the image subject and in a non-intrusive fashion.56 In many
cases, the subject has no objection to the taking of the picture, but may later be concerned
about viral online dissemination. Laws that regulate intrusive image-capturing are
therefore not much help when the subject’s concern is with online dissemination.57 Other
torts aimed at personal privacy will likewise have little to no application: for example, the
idea of an unauthorized appropriation of a person’s name or likeness will be of little use
in a peer context.58 For one thing, the appropriation is arguably not unauthorized if the
subject has consented to the taking of the photograph.59 For another thing, this tort
requires a commercial profit motive60 which is generally absent in the OSN context, at
least as between peers.
53

17 U.S.C. § 106 sets out the rights of a copyright holder to prevent unauthorized reproduction,
distribution, and preparation of derivative works based on a copyrighted work.
54
17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
55
See, for example, California Civil Code, § 1708.8(a) (“A person is liable for physical invasion of
privacy when the defendant knowingly enters onto the land of another person without permission or
otherwise committed a trespass in order to physically invade the privacy of the plaintiff with the intent to
capture any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in
a personal or familial activity and the physical invasion occurs in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable
person.”)
56
This would also be a shortcoming of the Camera Phone Predator Alert Act, H.R. 414 (111th Cong.,
2009) if it was ever enacted. It only deals with intrusive image-gathering, and not with any subsequent
unauthorized dissemination.
57
California Civil Code, § 1708.8 (f) specifically states that dissemination of images taken in
contravention of the earlier provisions of the section is not in and of itself a violation of the section: “Sale,
transmission, publication, broadcast, or use of any image or recording of the type, or under the
circumstances, described in this section shall not itself constitute a violation of this section, nor shall this
section be construed to limit all other rights or remedies of plaintiff in law or equity, including, but not
limited to, the publication of private facts.”
58
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 187 (“The appropriation tort would
rarely apply to the discussion on the Internet of people’s private lives or the posting of their photos.”) The
same might be said about the right of publicity tort: ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, at
§ 2.16[1] (“The right of publicity … is the right of an individual to control the commercial use of his or her
name, likeness, signature, or other personal characteristics.”) [hereinafter, GILSON LALONDE].
59
Of course, there may be cases where the taking of the image is initially authorized, but its
subsequent use in a commercial context is unauthorized. The commercial use requirement, however, will
generally not be made out when peers are simply posting images of each other online.
60
Appropriation actually appears as both a distinct limb of privacy law in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, and as a stand-alone tortious action in a number of American state jurisdictions known variously
as the “right of publicity” or “personality rights tort”. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652C (“One
who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other

10

Developing a Privacy Paradigm for Digital Video

Other privacy torts in the United States focus respectively on public disclosures of
private facts,61 and on publicity which places a person in a false light in the eyes of the
public.62 Both of these require some form of public disclosure63 which may be missing in
a closed social network such as Facebook or MySpace – although distribution over an
open network such as YouTube or Flickr would be another story.64 However, even where
there is a public disclosure, it is an open question whether the distribution will amount to
a disclosure of private facts, or will present a person in a false light. An individual may
object to the dissemination of an image even though it does not disclose any private facts,
and does not present her in a false light.65 The former tort also generally requires that the
private facts in question must have been shameful by an objective standard which is often
difficult to prove.66 The information must also not have been newsworthy67 - a standard
that has proved notoriously difficult to define.68
for invasion of his privacy.”). For an example of a right of publicity tort, see California Civil Code, §
3344(a) (“Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any
manner on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting
purchases of products, merchandise, goods or services, without such person's prior consent, or, in the case
of a minor, the prior consent of his parent or legal guardian, shall be liable for any damages sustained by
the person or persons injured as a result thereof.”).
61
For a discussion of current problems and future directions with this branch of privacy law in the
online context, see Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARVARD
JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 1 (2007) [hereinafter, Recasting Privacy].
62
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652D (“One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the
private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized
is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to
the public.”)
63
id, § 652E (“One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before
the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light
in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had
knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in
which the other would be placed.”); Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy, supra note ___, at 9-11 (discussing
practical difficulties of individual plaintiffs establishing requisite disclosures of private facts both in the
physical world and online).
64
A “closed” network is one in which the participants have some control over who has access to
information and videos they post online, while an open network is generally accessible to anyone with an
Internet connection.
65
One example of this, although not a “peer” based incursion into privacy is the example of the
“lady eating a peach” video that David Letterman repeatedly showed on his late night television program.
It embarrassed the woman who was caught on camera eating an over-ripe peach indelicately at the U.S.
Open, but it did not show anything false about her: David Usborne, Peach Lady Puts Squeeze on TV Star,
THE INDEPENDENT, London (Feb 7, 1996) (full text available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4158/is_/ai_n14027742, last viewed on January 12, 2009).
66
Jonathan B Mintz, The Remains of Privacy’s Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private
Domain, 55 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW 425, 439 (1996) (“Whether a fact is private by nature - that is,
whether a reasonable person would feel seriously aggrieved by its disclosure - is the subject of some
disagreement.”)
67
Abril and Cava, supra note ___, at 265 (“[T]o succeed on a privacy tort claim, the information
must not be of public concern. If the … information disclosed is newsworthy or of public concern, the
aggrieved is precluded from recover in tort, as such recovery is preempted by the formidable First
Amendment.”)
68
Mintz, supra note ___, at 441-442 (“Facts of "legitimate public concern" or "newsworthy" facts,
even if legally private, may be disclosed without any liability under this tort. Regardless of whether a
plaintiff must affirmatively prove that facts disclosed were not newsworthy, or whether defendants can be
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Related to the privacy torts is the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.69 Like the privacy torts, this tort is likely to be of limited use in the situations
under consideration in this Article.70 However, that might change if courts reassess the
contours of the tort in light of online activities.71 The main problem with this tort is that it
has generally required outrageous or malicious conduct on the part of a defendant.72 It is
unlikely that private individuals posting videos of each other online would be found to be
engaging in such conduct.73

3. Defamation
For defamation law to assist a person concerned about unauthorized dissemination
of an image online, the dissemination would have to amount to a defamatory
communication.74 This would require proof that the image is both false and harmful to
the subject’s reputation.75 This is likely an insurmountable hurdle in most cases involving
OSNs. Images are unlikely to be false for defamation purposes unless they have been
doctored. Further, defamation law can do little about viral distributions of personal
images, or about the permanence problem. Enforcement of a defamation order76 online
can be problematic if the information in question exists in multiple websites and in
multiple jurisdictions by the time the order is made.77 Additionally, online intermediaries
such as Internet service providers, who serve as conduits for potentially defamatory
content – and are often the easiest potential defendants to identify – are generally immune
from liability.78

4. Data Protection Law in the European Union

said to enjoy a privilege or a defense, many have declared that the broad scope of the newsworthiness
doctrine has "decimated the tort."”)
69
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46 (1977).
70
Abril, (My)Space, supra note ___, at 81 (noting that the tort is ineffectual in the OSN context
because conduct in question is usually not sufficiently “extreme and outrageous” and because many courts
require physical manifestations of the claimed emotional distress).
71
MILLS, supra note ___, at 195 (“The law [on intentional infliction of emotional distress] is still in
a stage of development, and the ultimate limits of this tort have not yet been determined.”)
72
id.
73
It is also unlikely that OSN providers would be found to be directly liable for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. Any action for secondary liability against an OSN provider would also likely prove
fruitless because of the application of § 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996: MILLS, supra
note ___, at 35 (discussing recent judicial applications of the Communications Decency Act, § 230, to
immunize Internet service providers from liability for information that is posted by a user of the service).
74
Langvardt, supra note ___, at 334.
75
id.
76
Jennifer Meredith Liebman, Defamed by a Blogger: Legal Protections, Self Regulation, and
Other Failures, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 343, 368-372 (2006) (describing different kinds of
defamation remedies that may be sought online including a retraction, an injunction, and damages).
77
id, at 368 (noting that even if the complainant obtains a retraction by the original poster of
defamatory context, the information is likely available in many other places online, including places like
the Internet Archive Project that preserves information that has already been retracted from websites)
78
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”).
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While this discussion has so far focused largely on American privacy law,
international comparisons may be instructive. The European Union, for example,
provides stronger data protection for its citizens than the United States. A cornerstone of
the European Union approach to privacy is the European Union Data Protection
Directive.79 While the Directive is intended to have a wide reach, it has some limitations
in the OSN context. For one thing, it is generally limited to conduct occurring within the
European Union.80 Thus, it does not have global reach, subject to provisions that extend
its operation to data about its citizens transmitted to third countries.81 Perhaps more
importantly, it was drafted with the processing of textual data in mind, largely in the
context of business or governmental dealings with personal information. There may be
some question about the extent to which it would apply in the OSN context.
While “personal data” is defined broadly as “any information relating to an
identified or identifiable natural person”,82 there are potentially two important limitations.
The first is that the Directive covers “information processing activities” which are
conceived in terms that contemplate largely professional, governmental, or commercial
activities involving compilations of individual information. On the other hand,
“processing” is defined broadly to encapsulate “any operation or set of operations which
is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection,
recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use,
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or
combination, blocking, erasure or destruction”.83 Thus, it is possible that the broad
definition of personal data could include digital video images and the broad definition of
processing could include dissemination of those images over an OSN.
The second limitation on the Directive’s operation may be more problematic.
Article 3(2) creates an exception for the processing of personal data “by a natural person
in the course of a purely personal or household activity”. Social networking activities
might well fall within this category. If that is the case, they would not be covered by the
Directive. Of course, the Directive may apply to OSNs that provide forums for online
networking, such as Facebook, MySpace, and Flickr. These services are businesses that
are not engaged in purely personal or household activities. An aggrieved plaintiff may
have recourse against a social networking site,84 but arguably not against specific peers
who post unauthorized images on the service.

79

Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data.
80
Most of the articles of the Directive apply to Member States of the European Union. However,
some provisions impact on transfers of data to third countries: See Data Protection Directive, Articles 25
and 26.
81
Data Protection Directive, Articles 25 & 26.
82
id., Article 2(a).
83
id., Article 2(b).
84
Of course, in the United States at least, there is a possibility that actions against online service
providers relating to the posting of information by users of the service would fail because of the operation
of 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) which immunizes Internet intermediaries from suit with respect to the speech of
others.
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Interestingly, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 2003 interpreted Article 3(2)
of the Directive as not excusing the mere posting on a publicly available website of
gossipy text relating to private individuals by a peer who worked in a church with them.85
It remains to be seen whether similar reasoning would apply to video, as opposed to text
records, or would apply to closed as opposed to open Internet sites. The court’s concern
in this case appeared to be with data being made available to an indefinite number of
people.86 Would posting information on a closed site such as Facebook meet this
criterion when arguably only a limited number of people can access the information?
The ECJ was also concerned that particularly sensitive information relating to a health
condition – a foot injury – had been disclosed on the Internet.87 Health information
receives special protection under the Directive.88 It remains to be seen whether the ECJ’s
reasoning would apply to less sensitive information, such as someone being
photographed drinking at a party, or kissing their best friend’s girlfriend.

B. LIMITATIONS OF CONTRACTUAL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS
Another possibility for protecting online video privacy might be found in OSNs’
terms of use. OSNs currently vary widely in the extent to which they impose terms on
their users to respect others’ privacy.89 YouTube and Flickr, for example, allow large
scale public dissemination of video with few privacy protections. These services exercise
some control over contents,90 but rely heavily on users to self-police.91 Yahoo’s terms of
85

Re Bodil Lindqvist, Paras 46-48 (ECJ, Luxemborg, November 6, 2003, full text available at:
http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgibin/gettext.pl?lang=en&num=79968893C19010101&doc=T&ouvert=T&seance=ARRET, last viewed on
December 16, 2008).
86
id., at ¶ 47.
87
id, at ¶ 12.
88
Data Protection Directive, Art. 8(1) (“Member States shall prohibit the processing of personal data
revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union
membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life.”) (emphasis added)
89
They can also change them at any time without notice to the consumer. In fact, in the early days
of the Internet, a Canadian court expressly recognized a general Internet service provider’s ability to do just
that – and was prepared to enforce the changed terms: 1267623 Ontario Inc v Nexx Online Inc, [1999] O.J.
No. 2246, ¶ 31 (Court File No. C20546/99, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Toronto, Ontario, June 14,
1999) (“[Defendant] is permitted to add terms to the Contract precluding a … client sending unsolicited
bulk e-mail directly, or through a third party.”); Abril and Cava, supra note ___, at 267 (noting that online
contracts are effectively built on shifting sands and can be changed unilaterally without notice to
consumers).
90
See, for example, clause 7.B of YouTube’s Terms of Use: “YouTube reserves the right to decide
whether Content or a User Submission is appropriate and complies with these Terms of Service for
violations other than copyright infringement, such as, but not limited to, pornography, obscene or
defamatory material, or excessive length. YouTube may remove such User Submissions and/or terminate a
User's access for uploading such material in violation of these Terms of Service at any time, without prior
notice and at its sole discretion.” (available at http://youtube.com/t/terms, last viewed on May 14, 2008).
However, note that some commentators have suggested that many of these policies are not actually
enforced in practice: Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy, supra note ___, at 14, fn 84 (noting that there is
little to no apparent enforcement of MySpace’s terms of use as an example of lack of effective policing by
online social network services providers).
91
See, for example, clause 6 of Yahoo’s Terms of Use relating to “Member Conduct”, available at
info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos-173.html, last viewed on May 14, 2008; clause 6 of YouTube’s
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use, for example, which are expressly incorporated into agreements to use Flickr, provide
that each subscriber agrees not to use the online service to upload or distribute content
that is: “unlawful, harmful, threatening, abusive, harassing, tortious, defamatory, vulgar,
obscene, libelous, invasive of another's privacy, hateful, or racially, ethnically or
otherwise objectionable”.92 YouTube’s Terms of Use provide that users agree not to post
material that is: “copyrighted, protected by trade secret or otherwise subject to third
party proprietary rights, including privacy and publicity rights” without permission of the
rights-holder.93
Some closed networks such as Facebook incorporate more strongly worded
privacy protections into their terms of use. Not only does Facebook include a clause very
similar to the above terms from Yahoo and YouTube,94 it also requests that its
subscribers not use the service to upload: “any videos other than those of a personal
nature that: (i) are of you or your friends, (ii) are taken by you or your friends, or (iii) are
original art or animation created by you or your friends.”95 Additionally, Facebook’s
terms of use provide that: “You may not post, transmit, or share User Content on the Site
or Service that you did not create or that you do not have permission to post.”96
However, it is not clear whose permission is required to post what information: for
example, if I take a group photograph of my high school class, do I have to obtain the
whole class’ permission to post the photograph? What form does that permission have to
take? If I simply ask my classmates at the time of taking the photo whether anyone
minds if I post the photo on my Facebook page, and no one expressly objects, would that
constitute permission?
What if I take a photograph or video in a crowded mall that includes people I
know and people I don’t know? Do I need to obtain permission from all the photographic
subjects to post the photograph online? What if I take a video of two otters swimming
side by side – for some reason a popular YouTube contribution.97 Whose permission do I
need, if any, to show this video online? The zookeeper’s? Any bystanders who may
appear in the picture? What if one of the bystanders is doing something embarrassing,
Terms of Use relating to “User Submissions and Conduct”, available at http://youtube.com/t/terms, last
viewed on May 14, 2008.
92
Yahoo’s Terms of Use, clause 6(a), available at info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos173.html, last viewed on May 14, 2008 (emphasis added).
93
YouTube’s Terms of Use, clause 6.D., available at http://youtube.com/t/terms, last viewed on
May 14, 2008 (emphasis added).
94
Facebook’s Terms of Use, “User Conduct” clause, available at
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php, last viewed on May 14, 2008.
95
id. See also Facebook’s Code of Conduct, available at
http://www.facebook.com/codeofconduct.php, last viewed on May 14, 2008. Facebook further provides its
users with a set of Privacy Principles organized around two “core principles”, the second of which states
that: “There is an increasing amount of information available out there, and you may want to know what
relates to you, your friends, and people around you. We want to help you easily get that information.”:
Facebook Principles, available at http://www.facebook.com/policy.php, last viewed on May 14, 2008.
96
Facebook Terms of Use, Clause on “User Content Posted on the Site”, available at
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php, last viewed on May 14, 2008.
97
YouTube, “Otters Holding Hands” (available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=epUk3T2Kfno, last viewed on July 23, 2008).

15

Developing a Privacy Paradigm for Digital Video
such as picking her nose or breastfeeding her baby? What if one of the bystanders is
kissing or holding hands with a homosexual partner, and it turns out that the person is not
openly gay? Do I owe any greater concern for their privacy because of the potential
discomfort, embarrassment or harm it might cause them to have people see this conduct
online?
With respect to the “permission to post” requirement, it is likely that the drafting
intention was to capture permission of those with proprietary interests in relevant content,
such as copyrights or trademarks. It seems reasonable to require me to obtain permission
to post something, like a movie clip, that might otherwise infringe copyright. However,
privacy rights work differently – if at all – in this context because it is not always clear
that there is a rights holder in this context as contemplated by many OSN terms of use.
Even if there is an obvious victim harmed by the posting of an image, the nature of her
legal rights in the image is unclear. Some commentators have suggested that privacy
should be treated as an intangible property right,98 but there is little consensus on this
point.99

98

SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note __, at 24-29 (critiquing property based theories of
privacy); Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN L REV 1283, 1288-1294
(2000) (describing various theories of private information as property).
99
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 27 (“Extending property concepts to
personal information … has difficulties. Information can be easily transmitted and, once known by others,
cannot be eradicated from their minds. Unlike physical objects, information can be possessed
simultaneously within the minds of millions. This is why intellectual-property law protects particular
tangible expressions of ideas rather than the underlying ideas themselves. The complexity of personal
information is that it is both an expression of the self and a set of facts – a historical record of one’s
behavior.”); Litman, supra note ___, at 1294-1295 (“Whether or not it could be easily implemented, a
privacy-as-property solution carries with it some serious disadvantages. Our society has a longstanding
commitment to freedom of expression. Property rights in any sort of information raise significant policy
and free speech issues. Facts are basic building blocks: building blocks of expression; of self-government;
and of knowledge itself. When we recognize property rights in facts, we endorse the idea that facts may be
privately owned and that the owner of a fact is entitled to restrict the uses to which that fact may be put.
That notion is radical. It is also inconsistent with much of our current First Amendment jurisprudence.
Thus, the idea of creating property rights in personal data raises fundamental constitutional issues. If it
looked likely that a property rights model would prove to be an effective tool for protecting personal data
privacy, it might be worthwhile to balance the privacy and free speech interests to see which one weighed
more. [H]owever, a property rights model would be ineffective in protecting data privacy. It would, in all
likelihood, make the problem worse.”); Richard Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
393, 397-401 (1978) (critiquing theories that favour personal property rights in private information); Diane
Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to Say? One View of the Public Domain, 73
FORDHAM L REV 297, 348-9 (2004) (“[F]rom the birth of the common law right of privacy, courts
recognized that there is a downside to granting individuals control over how others can use information
about them. It significantly strips others of the wherewithal to form their own ideas, utilize their own
observations, and communicate about these things with friends, colleagues, and fellow citizens. The fear of
this unconstitutional consequence is why broad newsworthiness rules have cabined the tort almost to the
point of annihilation. This strongly suggests that the ability to use speech goods is a necessary element of
what the First Amendment protects, and that, as a result, it is very risky to allow individuals to “own” or
control use of their life stories.”) [hereinafter, The Public Domain]; Diane Zimmerman, Information as
Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WILLIAM AND
MARY LAW REVIEW 665 (1992) (arguing that the increasing commodification of information potentially
impinges on First Amendment freedoms) [hereinafter, Information as Speech].

16

Developing a Privacy Paradigm for Digital Video
What about the question of the standing of a video subject to bring a complaint
under an OSN’s terms of use? Even if that person can establish a sufficient legal interest
in her image to satisfy the “permission to post” aspect of an OSN’s terms of use, her
recourse would be to complain to the OSN provider. It would be up to the provider to
decide whether the complaint had any merit, and whether to take any action against the
subscriber, such as removing the posting, or barring the subscriber from the system.100
The complainant probably has no standing to sue the service provider directly because
she is not a party to the subscriber’s contract with the service provider. Additionally, at
least in the United States, § 230 of the Communications Decency Act probably
immunizes the service provider from secondary liability for its subscribers’ postings.101
There are further limitations with relying on OSNs’ terms of use to protect
privacy. Even Facebook’s requirement that users limit their postings to photographs of
themselves and their friends, or photographs taken by themselves or their friends, is open
to interpretation. On a closed network like Facebook, the term “friends” means
something different to the way we use the term in the physical world.102 In the physical
world, we know whether or not we are acquainted with a person. We may not know
them, and we may even have forgotten their name, but we are unlikely to consider
someone we have never met a “friend”.
This is quite different online. A “friend” on Facebook is anyone who has given
you permission to join their online network of “friends”, whether or not they have ever
met you. Although Facebook contemplates that its subscribers will use the service to find
people online whom they already know in the real world,103 there is no way to ensure that
this is the case in practice. It is easy to make anonymous online contacts on Facebook,
and for those contacts to quickly be considered “friends”. These contacts will increase
the potential recipients of information on a subscriber’s site to many people whom the
subscriber, and the subject of any information on the subscriber’s website, may not

100

See, for example, YouTube’s Terms of Use, Clause 7.B (“YouTube reserves the right to decide
whether Content or a User Submission is appropriate and complies with these Terms of Service for
violations other than copyright infringement, such as, but not limited to, pornography, obscene or
defamatory material, or excessive length. YouTube may remove such User Submissions and/or terminate a
User's access for uploading such material in violation of these Terms of Service at any time, without prior
notice and at its sole discretion.”), available at http://youtube.com/t/terms, last viewed on May 14, 2008.
101
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider. “)
102
ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 218 (noting that a person’s “friends” network online includes their
“friends’ friends’ friends.”); See Abril and Cava, supra note ___, at fn 69 (“The online social networking
environment has brought about a sweeping change in its users’ notions of intimacy, friendship, and
confidentiality.”)
103
For example, Facebook’s information on finding friends online states that: “Your friends on
Facebook are the same friends, acquaintances and family members that you communicate with in the real
world.” (available at https://register.facebook.com/findfriends.php?ref_friends, last viewed on May 14,
2008). Facebook also prohibits the use of aliases online so that people who think they are being contacted
by someone they actually know are really being contacted by that person: for example, the User Conduct
clause of Facebook’s Terms of Use prohibits impersonating any person, falsely representing yourself, and
creating a false identity (available at http://www.facebook.com/terms.php, last viewed on May 14, 2008).
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actually know.104 Thus, “friends” in a closed network’s terms of use may be a
deceptively comforting concept.105 Commentators have recognized a number of
additional limitations with relying on contractual mechanisms to protect privacy online.
These limitations include the fact that such contracts are often not consistently
enforced,106 and the fact that there are insufficient inexpensive and accessible online
dispute resolution services available for contract-based disputes.107 Another shortcoming
of reliance on contractual privacy protections is the fact that the onus is currently on users
of an online service to continually check back for changes in privacy policies.108 As
these policies often vary from service to service, and Internet users tend to use a variety
of services,109 this can be a particularly onerous burden. Contractual terms about privacy
are also often written in abstruse or legalistic terms which are difficult for users to
comprehend.110

104

Of course, the practical problems can potentially be greater on an open network that does not even
attempt to limit dissemination of information to “friends”.
105
One could argue that in the online world individuals have a responsibility to exercise more care
than they currently do about who they befriend. The problem is that this is easier said than done. In the
real world there are physical constraints on who can be befriended and how many friends one can make –
in terms of time and geography. Additionally, in the physical world, one can glean more cues than in
virtual space about whether the rewards of befriending someone outweigh the risks. These cues come from
watching the person interact in real world situations. In physical spaces, we also recognize different
“levels” of friendship. We can thus repose less trust in someone we do not know very well. In the OSN
context, however, the choice is effectively binary – someone is either your “friend”, entitling them access
to anything you post online, or they are not your friend, and therefore not entitled to access your online
materials at all: SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note __, at 202 (noting that technologies like
Facebook require a binary definition of the term “friend” – a “friend” is permitted access to your
information while a non-friend is not - while a social network in the real world is much more complex).
There are no gradations of friendship online, although there is no necessary technological impediment to
developing such levels. A system could be developed in the future that would allow users to exercise
discretion about who received what, and how much, information from them. This could be done by
building more “levels of friendship” into OSN technologies. Thus, one could identify online peers as either
“good friends”, “friends”, or “acquaintances” and differentiate levels of access to personal information
accordingly. Abril and Cava, supra note ___, at 272 (suggesting the development of levels or “zones” of
relationships in the context of private health information available online).
106
Abril and Cava, supra note ___, at 267 (“Spotty enforcement and lack of mechanisms for dispute
resolution further weaken the power of contract law online.”)
107
id.
108
id. (“Website contracts are built on shifting sands. The professed ability of many operators to
change terms of use at any moment and without prior notice leaves users in a constant state of uncertainty
about their rights and privacy expectations.”)
109
id. (“[T]erms of use and privacy policies vary from website to website, making true understanding
of each contract … difficult and impracticable, especially since most users visit several websites a day.”
110
id. (“Many user contracts are written abstrusely or in a legalistic style, dissuading even the most
punctilious consumer from taking time out of her online pursuit to carefully read and understand them.”)
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III. WHY (NOT) REGULATE VIDEO PRIVACY?
A. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR VIDEO PRIVACY REGULATION
So far, this article has addressed practical problems relating to digital video
privacy, and gaps in the existing legal framework. The next step is to find justifications
for a new approach to video privacy. In doing so, four potential criticisms of the idea of
taking a new regulatory approach should be addressed. They include the argument that
there is no accepted theoretical basis for regulating privacy. It is not clear whether
privacy is a property right, an aspect of personhood, or something else. In the absence of
a clear and unified theoretical underpinning for privacy rights, some may argue that
regulation is undesirable. The second reservation against video privacy regulation is the
argument that it is more appropriate to regulate specific harms resulting from discrete
privacy incursions than to regulate privacy more generally. Discrete harms may include
loss of employment111 or employment prospects,112 physical injury,113 psychological
harm,114 and denial of access to education or health services. A third reservation about
video privacy regulation would suggest that the First Amendment may be an
insurmountable barrier to the regulation of truthful speech about private individuals, at
least in the United States. And a final concern about regulating video privacy is the idea
that such regulation is impracticable because of the scale and global nature of online
privacy problems. The remainder of this article addresses these issues and suggests a
way forward by creating a multi-modal framework for online video privacy regulation.115

B. THE SEARCH FOR A UNIFIED THEORY OF PRIVACY
One thorny issue in any discussion of reworking or extending privacy protections
is the question of the theoretical basis on which this might be done. Despite well over a
century of discourse about the legal nature of privacy, no clear consensus has emerged.116
111

As in the “dog poop girl” example: see Part I supra.
As in the AutoAdmit case involving the unauthorized posting of sexually explicit information
about Yale students, one of whom alleged she lost a job offer as a result of the posting: see Isaac Arnsdorf,
AutoAdmit Case Moves Forward, YALE DAILY NEWS, Jan, 31, 2008 (available at
http://www.yaledailynews.com/articles/view/23231, last viewed on January 12, 2009).
113
As in the “bus uncle: example: see Part I supra.
114
As in the case of “Star Wars kid”: see Part I supra.
115
The first three issues are addressed in Part III infra, while the final issue about the practicality of
regulating for video privacy online is addressed in Part IV infra along with the discussion of a suggested
framework for video privacy regulation.
116
In fact, even Professor Solove’s groundbreaking attempts to create a conception or taxonomy of
privacy are not pinned down to one concrete unifying theory: SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra
note ___, at 105 (“My taxonomy’s categories are not based upon any overarching principle. We do not
need overarching principles to understand and recognize problems …. If we focus on the problems, we can
better understand and address them. I aim to shift the approach to a bottom-up focus on problems that are
all related to each other, yet not in exactly the same way….”); Daniel Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90
CALIFORNIA L REV 1087, 1129 (2002) (“[T]his Article advances as “approach” to understanding privacy
rather than a definition or formula for privacy….My approach is from the bottom up rather than the top
down because it conceptualizes privacy within particular contexts rather than in the abstract.”) [hereinafter,
Conceptualizing Privacy].
112
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Some commentators have argued that it is not necessary to identify any one unifying
theoretical framework for privacy in order to regulate it effectively.117 They suggest that
if we can identify actual harms relating to privacy, this is a sufficient basis to formulate a
regulatory framework.118 This may be the right approach, even if it is not theoretically
satisfying or complete.
This approach is also not as unusual as it might seem. Many legal rights –notably
intangible property rights - developed organically as the need arose.119 Trademarks, for
example, developed to address the need to prevent unfair competition relating to false or
misleading branding of goods or services.120 There is still some dispute as to whether
trademarks are appropriately characterized as property rights as a matter of theory.121
Nevertheless, the system still works in practice. Trade secrets are another example where
theoretical justifications are varied.122 Nevertheless, the system continues to function.
Even Internet domain names have an uncertain legal status as property.123 Nevertheless,

117

id.
id.
119
Of course, there are costs and benefits to this approach. Organic development can fail to take into
account the complex matrix of interests that need to be balanced, such as the need to balance free speech
interests against property interests, and to distinguish different types of information speech and information
property: see, for example, discussion in Zimmerman, Information as Speech, supra note ___. It is also
possible that an organic approach might miss a critical period for regulatory decision-making after which
regulations are difficult to implement and enforce, particularly if they would contradict entrenched social
norms of behavior: see Gaia Bernstein, The Paradoxes of Technological Diffusion: Genetic
Discrimination and Internet Privacy, 39 CONNECTICUT L REV 241 (2006) [hereinafter, Paradoxes];
Bernstein, New Technologies, supra note ___. These articles are in reality advocating an approach that
allows for some organic/incremental development while at the same time being sensitive to points at which
legal regulation – or other regulatory approaches discussed in Part IV – are necessary.
120
LEXIS, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION DESKBOOK, § 1.01.
121
Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L J 1687,
1693-1694 (1999) (noting in the context of United States law that it is very difficult to find a rationale to
treat trademarks as a form of property). This may be compared with jurisdictions like the United Kingdom
and Australia where trademarks are explicitly defined as a form of personal property in the relevant
legislation: Trade Marks Act, U.K. § 2(1) (1994) (“A registered trade mark is a property right obtained by
the registration of the trade mark under this Act and the proprietor of a registered mark has the rights and
remedies provided by this Act.”); Trade Marks Act, Austl., § 21(1) (1995) (specifically defining a “trade
mark” as a personal property right).
122
Jacqueline Lipton, Protecting Valuable Commercial Information in the Digital Age: Law, Policy,
and Practice, 6 JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW AND POLICY 1, 9-15 (2001) (comparing the theoretical
treatment of trade secrets in different jurisdictions, including Australia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States) (full text available at: http://grove.ufl.edu/~techlaw/vol6/issue1/lipton.html, last viewed on
July 24, 2008).
123
For example, in some contexts domain names have been regarded as a form of intangible personal
property: Kremen v Cohen, 337 F. 3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003) (domain names treated as property for the
purposes of California’s conversion law); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (allowing in rem proceedings against
domain names as property in certain circumstances). See also discussion in MILTON MUELLER, RULING
THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING OF CYBERSPACE, 58-61 (2002) (discussing the
nature of claims to property rights in domain names). In other context, domain names are regarded as the
object of a contractual license with a registering authority: Network Solutions, Inc v Umbro International
Inc, 529 S.E.2d 80 (Va. 2000) (domain names not regarded as a new form of property for the purpose of
garnishment proceedings).
118
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the domain name system continues to function, while market forces, social norms, and
judicial and arbitral decisions124 iron out the underlying philosophical creases.
Could privacy similarly emerge as an intangible property right over time?
Property rights in information have always been contentious.125 They create concerns
about chilling speech.126 Governments who create property rights in information must act
to preserve the balance between those rights and speech. This is a difficult task and is not
always successfully achieved in practice.127 There is also the valid question as to why
personal information should be regarded as property in the hands of its subject. It is
tempting to say that if something has value, as private information potentially does,128 it
should be treated as property. The problem with this reasoning is that much of the
economic value in online information has been in text records in the hands of data
aggregators.129 While there may be good reasons to create property in compilations of
text records,130 it is not necessarily clear that personal information in the hands of the
individual to whom it relates is a valuable commodity in its own right.131

124

Arbitral decisions on domain names are actually very common under the Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy incorporated by reference into many domain name contracts: see
http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm, last viewed on October 14, 2008.
125
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note __, at 24-29 (critiquing property based theories of
privacy); Litman, supra note ___, at 1288-1294 (describing various theories of private information as
property).
126
Litman, supra note ___, at 1294-1295; Zimmerman, The Public Domain, supra note ___, at 310,
348-9; Zimmerman, Information as Speech, supra note ___ (arguing that the increasing commodification of
information potentially impinges on First Amendment freedoms).
127
In a federal system, the propertization of information can raise constitutional questions about
which level of government has legislative competence to enact relevant laws. Perhaps even more
significantly, some have argued that no government may have constitutional competence to recognize or
create property rights in factual personal information because of potential encroachments on First
Amendment freedoms. See discussion in SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, surpa note ___, at 129132 (describing problems in attempting to balance privacy torts with the idea of free speech); Diane
Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68
CORNELL L REV 291 (1983) (suggesting that torts prohibiting true speech cannot be reconciled with the
First Amendment) [hereinafter, Requiem]; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy:
The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN L REV 1049
(2000) (suggesting that tortious approaches to protecting privacy cannot be reconciled with the First
Amendment, but that contractual approaches may avoid this criticism); See Zimmerman, The Public
Domain, supra note ___, at 298, 312, 366, 369 (arguing in favor of a mandatory public domain which may
encroach on the government’s ability to create property rights that would interfere with the public domain
of information and ideas).
128
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, 78-100 (detailed attempt to ascribe various
possible values to different aspects of privacy).
129
A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STANFORD L REV 1461, at 1502-3 (2000)
(noting that the value of a piece of data in a consumer’s hands is much less than the value of the aggregated
data about many consumers in a data aggregator’s hands).
130
See, for example, Jerome Reichman and Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in
Data?, 50 VAND L REV 51 (1997); Jacqueline Lipton, Balancing Private Rights and Public Policies:
Reconceptualizing Property Rights in Databases 18 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 773 (2003).
131
Froomkin, supra note ___, at 1502-3 (noting that the value of a piece of data in a consumer’s
hands is much less than the value of the aggregated data about many consumers in a data aggregator’s
hands).
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Arguments have been made that property rights would give a data subject more
control over the information in a transactional sense.132 However, if individuals have
insufficient economic bargaining power against data aggregators, the existence of a
property right in the hands of the individual will be of limited practical use. In the OSN
context, there is arguably even less need to recognize a property right to protect
individual privacy in video images – at least if the justification for the property right is
based on economic value and bargaining power. This is because private individuals
networking over OSNs are not likely doing so for transactional purposes that would
justify or necessitate a property right in their personal information.133 Of course, not all
property rights are justified on the basis of economic value.134 Many conceptions of
property do rely on economic value.135 While value and property are often aligned, it is
not necessarily the case that something must be commercially valuable to be property or
that something must be property if it has a commercial value.136
Putting economic value aside, property rights may be characterized by other
attributes: the ability to exclude others; the ability to enjoy an item free from
interference; or, the ability to alienate or transfer rights whether or not for commercial
value.137 These typical proprietary attributes are generally missing from personal
information. It would be difficult for an individual to function in society, particularly
online, without leaving footprints involving disclosures of personal information. Thus,
there is no way of excluding others from personal information or of enjoying the
information free from interference. Sometimes information is required by others, as by

132

Ann Bartow, Our Data, Ourselves: Privacy, Propertization, and Gender, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 633,
687 (2000) (“Simply put, if information about us is to be bought and sold, the initial purchase should be
from us, since we are the ultimate content providers. If intangible property rights are rewards for the effort
expended in creating the thing to be protected, we are entitled to ownership of our personal information.”)
133
There may be a justification for imputing a property right to the OSN provider in respect of its
meta-collection of data on the grounds that OSN operators do utilize this data for commercial purposes.
However, even that argument is tenuous in situations where an OSN does not transact with the data per se,
but rather utilizes its vast user base as an incentive to attract advertisers. This may be changing in practice.
Recent attempts at social ad programs by some OSNs do utilize specific data about individuals and their
online relationships with friends to better target advertising to their users: William McGeveran, Facebook
Inserting Users Into Ads, Info/Law, November 8, 2007 (available at
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2007/11/08/facebook-social-ads/, last viewed on July 24, 2008);
Megan McCarthy, Facebook Ads Make You the Star – and You May Not Know It, Wired Blog Network,
January 2, 2008 (available at http://blog.wired.com/business/2008/01/facebook-ads-ma.html, last viewed on
July 24, 2008).
134
In fact, Professor Charles Fried implicitly accepted the proprietary nature of privacy in the context
of interpersonal relationships where the privacy right would have no real economic value, but would have a
social value: Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL 475, 487 (1968) (describing privacy as a
form of “moral capital for personal relations” and referring to holding “title” to information about oneself).
135
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK
DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY, 19 (2004) (“But the “if value, then right” theory of creative
property has never been America’s theory of creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.”)
[hereinafter, FREE CULTURE]
136
id. An old dog-eared copy of a Shakespeare play, for example, may no longer have any economic
value, but it will still be property. On the other hand, a person’s time may be valuable, but it will not
necessarily be property.
137
Courtney Tedrow, Conceptual Severance and Takings in the Federal Circuit, 85 CORNELL L REV
586, 591 (2000) (identifying classic property rights as including rights of exclusion, disposition, and use).
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contract, to complete a purchase.138 Other times the information is incidentally observed
as part of functioning in society: for example, if you go to the shops, people will see what
you look like, an image of you may be captured on a security camera in a department
store, etc.139 Online, individuals constantly leave digital footprints involving this kind of
information.140
Of course, advocates of property rights in personal information may argue that it
is these very aspects of personal privacy that require a property label. The necessity of
transacting with this information on a daily basis requires that individuals be entitled to
bargain for exchanges involving the information.141 However, this is a circular argument.
It assumes that something should be labeled property because individuals are forced to
disclose it, and therefore they should be compensated for doing so.142 Outside of property
theory, there may be arguments based on autonomy and personhood for granting legal
rights in personal information to a data subject.143 In attempts to explain the philosophical
underpinnings of the right of publicity, which is derived from the right to privacy,
commentators have suggested basing such rights in notions of autonomy and
personhood.144 This is a possibility, but the theoretical contours of rights of personhood
are unclear.145 In the end, this theory may not be any more useful than trying to pin down
privacy as a form of property. Ultimately, those who argue in favor of taking a bottom
up approach to developing privacy regulation in the absence of one clear unifying theory
probably have the right idea, at least for the present time.146 Privacy harms today are real
138

For example, details of a credit card or postal address for payment or shipping purposes.
Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN L REV 1193, 1198 (1998).
140
id.
141
Bartow, supra note ___, at 704 (“Once I own my own data, I personally look forward to
formulating a reverse “click-wrap” license, whereby any enterprise that wants me to visit its web site will
have to agree to MY list of terms and conditions …”).
142
Maybe this could be justified on the basis of unjust enrichment. In other words, data aggregating
businesses are unjustly enriched by individuals if they can put together valuable consumer profiles using
information “belonging to” consumers without compensating them for it. However, this analysis also
assumes the existence of an underlying property or quasi-property right in the plaintiff’s personal
information, so it is again circular: Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CALIF L REV 1191, 1214
(1995) (“Restitution can be seen as an aspect of the legal protection of property, and many instances of
what the law characterizes as unjust enrichment might be described by saying that the defendant has
received property of the plaintiff by means of a transfer that was legally ineffective to convey ownership.”)
143
Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note __, at 1116-1121 (discussion of personhood theories
of privacy); Daniel Solove, ‘I’ve Got Nothing to Hide’ and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN
DIEGO LAW REVIEW 745, 760-1 (2007) (noting that many theories of privacy view the notion of privacy as
an individual right related to protecting the individual’s personal dignity) [hereinafter, Nothing to Hide];
Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy, supra note ___, at 7-8 (“[O]thers have defined privacy in terms of
personhood, intimacy, and secrecy.”); SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 29-34
(critiquing “personhood” theories of privacy); Friend, supra note ___, at 483 (describing privcy as an
“aspect of personal liberty”).
144
See discussion in Jacqueline Lipton, Celebrity in Cyberspace: A Personality Rights Paradigm for
Personal Domain Name Disputes, forthcoming, 65 WASHINGTON & LEE LAW REVIEW 1445 (2008).
145
In the right of publicity context, see, for example, discussion in Mark McKenna, The Right of
Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U PITT L REV 225 (2005); Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who?
The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L J 383 (1999).
146
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 105 (“My taxonomy’s categories are not
based upon any overarching principle. We do not need overarching principles to understand and recognize
problems …. If we focus on the problems, we can better understand and address them. I aim to shift the
139
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and observable, and the search for a single unifying theory may take too long to address
the pressing needs facing online societies today.147

C. REGULATING SPECIFIC HARMS
This reasoning perhaps leads logically to the question that if privacy harms are
real and observable, why not redress specific harms rather than regulating to protect
privacy more generally? A number of commentators have suggested that the former
approach is preferable, largely because of First Amendment concerns and because of the
thought that attempting to regulate privacy online today is like locking the barn door after
the horse has bolted.148 These commentators have suggested that the best approach to
remedying privacy breaches in the twenty-first century is to focus on specific damages
caused by leaks of personal information, including discrimination in the workplace,
healthcare, and education.149 Indeed, some have suggested that the benefits of lack of
privacy could theoretically outweigh the costs.150 Some have even argued that the widescale dissemination of personal information is beneficial in that it can actually help the
public to understand existing social norms.151 However, there is reason to be skeptical of
an approach that fails to consider privacy as something worthy of protection in and of
itself. For one thing, many insecurities involving personal information do not result in
specific damage. Widespread unregulated online privacy incursions can create a general
culture of unease where individuals cannot rely on anyone to respect personal
boundaries.152
While there are good reasons for the law to address specific harms that result from
privacy breaches, such as dog poop girl’s loss of her job and Star Wars kid’s need for
psychological treatment, this does not preclude the need to adopt some regulations that
temper unbridled incursions into people’s privacy by means of digital video technologies.

approach to a bottom-up focus on problems that are all related to each other, yet not in exactly the same
way. If we study the problems together, we can better understand the entire cluster.”)
147
Bernstein, New Technologies, supra note ___.
148
Scott McNealy, CEO of Sun Microsystems said famously in 1999: “You have zero privacy. Get
over it.”: Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: ‘Get Over It’, WIRED, January 26, 1999 (available at
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538, last viewed on July 25, 2008).
149
DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO CHOOSE BETWEEN
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998); SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note ___, at 73-74; Strahilevitz,
Reputation Nation, supra note ___ (arguing that basing decisions on real information rather than dangerous
and discriminatory proxies such as race actually provides social benefits overall).
150
Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation, supra note ___ (arguing that basing decisions on real information
rather than dangerous and discriminatory proxies such as race actually provides social benefits overall);
Volokh, supra note ___, at 1120 (the government should not use privacy torts as a proxy for antidiscrimination laws); DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE USE TO
CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998).
151
Lior Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U CHI L REV 919, 928 (2005)
(“[D]issemination [of personal information] can also help the public understand existing social norms.
Indeed, gossip is often central in theories of social norm enforcement and change.”)
152
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note ___, at 97 (“[T]he invasion conception’s focus on
privacy invasions as harms to specific individuals often overlooks the fact that certain privacy problems are
structural – they affect not only particular individuals but society as a whole.”)
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Some legislation has been developed to regulate intrusive digital video photography.153
However, what is missing is regulation of online distributions of personally humiliating,
embarrassing, or damaging images.

D. PRIVACY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Of course, regulating privacy involves incursions on truthful expression. This
obviously runs up against the First Amendment. Professors Zimmerman and Volokh
have expressed concerns that privacy torts in particular are open to criticism as
unconstitutional encroachments on First Amendment freedoms.154 These scholars would
likely be unconvinced of arguments in favor of increasing the strength and scope of these
torts in the online world. However, that is not to say that there is no way of better
protecting privacy online without damaging First Amendment freedoms. Even First
Amendment scholars have recognized other avenues for protecting privacy, including
express and implied contracts of confidentiality, and extended breach of confidence
actions.155 This article also relies on an expanded concept of regulation as a multi-modal
enterprise that does not rely on legislation alone to protect privacy interests. While the
First Amendment aims to protect individual freedoms against government intrusions, it
will generally allow societies to develop social norms, market forces, and technological
solutions to perceived social problems.156 Thus, the only question remaining is how an
effective multi-modal regulatory framework for digital video privacy might be
developed, particularly given the global scope of online video privacy problems.

IV. A MULTI-MODAL APPROACH TO VIDEO PRIVACY
There will be no single sweeping reform that will bestow privacy on each of us.
-

Professor Jon Mills157

153

See, for example, Camera Phone Predator Alert bill, H.R. 414 (111th Cong., 2009); Cal. Civ. Code
§1708.8(b) (“A person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the defendant attempts to capture,
in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person, any type of visual image, sound recording, or other
physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial activity under circumstances in which
the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy, through the use of a visual or auditory enhancing
device, regardless of whether there is a physical trespass, if this image, sound recording, or other physical
impression could not have been achieved without a trespass unless the visual or auditory enhancing device
was used.”)
154
Volokh, supra note ___, at 1051 (“While privacy protection secured by contract is constitutionally
sound, broader information privacy rules are not easily defensible under existing free speech law.”); 1122
(“restrictions on speech that reveals personal information are constitutional under current doctrine only if
they are imposed by contract, express or implied”). Professor Zimmerman has also argued against the
constitutionality of privacy tort law on free speech grounds: Zimmerman, Requiem, supra note ___.
155
See discussion in Part IV.A.5 infra.
156
For a contrasting view, see Dawn Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20
BERKELEY TECH L J 1115 (2005) (expressing concern that the increasing control of public forums for
speech in private hands, such as OSN providers, will curtail meaningful First Amendment scrutiny and led
to privacy and arbitrary decisions about what kinds of speech are available online).
157
MILLS, supra note ___, at 306.
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The first and most important point to acknowledge about online video privacy
regulation is that there is no one solution to digital age privacy problems158 However, this
does not mean that it is futile to pursue enhanced privacy protections. It simply means
that regulation must be organic, adapting to societal needs as they develop. It also means
that we will likely need a more nuanced approach than simply relying on legislation and
the courts. Professor Lawrence Lessig famously identified four regulatory modalities that
would be useful in cyberspace generally, and that would help to develop protections for
online privacy in particular.159 These modalities comprised legal rules,160 social norms,161
markets,162 and system architecture.163
Social norms are similar to legal rules in that they threaten punishment for
disobedience.164 However, they differ from laws in that punishments are imposed by
communities, rather than government.165 Norms can be as effective, if not more effective,
than legal rules.166 The informal penalties for violating norms, while often less severe
than legal punishments, have a greater likelihood of being enforced than a legal rule in

158

id.
Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VANDERBILT J ENT L & PRAC 56, 62-3 (1999)
[hereinafter, The Architecture of Privacy].
160
Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARVARD L REV 501,
507 (1999) (“Law … orders people to behave in certain ways; it threatens punishment if they do not obey.
The law tells me not to buy certain drugs, not to sell cigarettes without a license, and not to trade across
international borders without first filing a customs form. It promises strict punishments if these orders are
not followed. In this way, we say that law regulates.”) [hereinafter, The Law of the Horse].
161
id. (“Norms control where I can smoke; they affect how I behave with members of the opposite
sex; they limit what I may wear; they influence whether I will pay my taxes. Like law, norms regulate by
threatening punishment ex post. But unlike law, the punishments of norms are not centralized. Norms are
enforced (if at all) by a community, not by a government. In this way, norms constrain, and therefore
regulate.”). Not all norms will threaten punishment for disobedience. Some norms can be maintained
without any penalty for violation: Strandburg, supra note___, at 1246-9 (“coordination norms” can be
maintained without imposing sanctions for noncompliance because individuals have no incentive to deviate
from norms that depend on a large group of people performing the same action in the same way; “epistemic
norms” do not require sanctions because individuals conform to these norms as a means of economizing
information costs so there is no incentive for others to enforce the norms against individuals).
162
Lessig, The Law of the Horse, supra, note ___, at 507 (“Markets, too, regulate. They regulate by
price. The price of gasoline limits the amount one drives - more so in Europe than in the United States. The
price of subway tickets affects the use of public transportation - more so in Europe than in the United
States.”)
163
id., at 507-509 (“[T]here is a fourth feature of real space that regulates behavior - "architecture."
By "architecture" I mean the physical world as we find it, even if "as we find it" is simply how it has
already been made. That a highway divides two neighborhoods limits the extent to which the
neighborhoods integrate. That a town has a square, easily accessible with a diversity of shops, increases the
integration of residents in that town. That Paris has large boulevards limits the ability of revolutionaries to
protest. That the Constitutional Court in Germany is in Karlsruhe, while the capital is in Berlin, limits the
influence of one branch of government over the other. These constraints function in a way that shapes
behavior. In this way, they too regulate.”)
164
id, at 507. Subsequent literature has demonstrated that norms are actually more complex than this,
and that there are various different kinds of norms that operate in different ways: Strandburg, supra note
___. However, for the purposes of this discussion, Lessig’s definition will suffice.
165
id.
166
Strandburg, supra note ___, at 1248 (“Social norms often play a more important role than legal
regulation.”)
159
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many contexts.167 Markets regulate by imposing price constraints on certain behaviors.168
One example in the privacy context would be where online firms charge more to
consumers for providing greater assurances of personal privacy.169 Architecture, on the
other hand, regulates by physically constraining certain behaviors.170 In the real world,
for example, the erection of a border fence may constrain illegal immigration.171 The
cyberspace analog to physical world architecture is system architecture or “code”.172
None of these modalities operates in a vacuum. Their interaction facilitates given
behaviors.173 Additionally, these modalities are not comprehensive. There are other
modalities that usefully regulate online conduct. Thus, we might also recognize
modalities such as public education,174 and, private/non-profit institutions.175 The
institutions comprised in the latter category might include OSNs themselves, but perhaps
more to the point, public interest organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation

167

id, (“When social norms are feasible they can be quite effective. Though the informal penalties
for violating social norms may be less severe than the penalties available under the law, the likelihood of
being penalized may be quite high.”).
168
Lessig, The Law of the Horse, supra, note ___, at 507.
169
Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, supra note ___, at 62. Of course, Professor Lessig here may
have been contemplating privacy protections for posters customers of service providers who are more
likely to be posters of private information than victims of unauthorized postings of private information by
others. However, this would depend upon the scope and nature of the privacy policy promulgated by a
given online service provider. Where an online service provider offered to protect privacy of both posters
and subjects of information and images, more people may be drawn to that service provider because of the
signals the service provider gives about being a generally good online corporate citizen. Some online
service providers do currently at least purport to protect the privacy of third parties as well as their own
customers – see discussion of relevant terms of use in Parts II.B and IV.A.5.
170
Lessig, The Law of the Horse, supra note ___, at 507-508.
171
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note ___, at 98-99 (giving examples of ways in which
physical architectures can constrain behavior); LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note ___, at 122 (2004) (“A
fallen bridge might constrain your ability to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability
of a community to integrate its social life. As with the market, architecture does not effect its constraint
through ex post punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects its constraint through
simultaneous conditions.”).
172
Lessig, The Law of the Horse, supra note ___, at 509 (“[T]he architecture of cyberspace, or its
code, regulates behavior in cyberspace. The code, or the software and hardware that make cyberspace the
way it is, constitutes a set of constraints on how one can behave.”)
173
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra, note ___, at 123 (“[T]he first point about these four modalities of
regulation is obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be reinforced by another. Or
restrictions imposed by one might be undermined by another.”). See also Froomkin, supra note ___, 1466
(“While there may be no single tactic that suffices to preserve the status quo, much less regain lost privacy,
a smorgasbord of creative technical and legal approaches could make a meaningful stand against what
otherwise seems inevitable.”); Lessig, The Law of the Horse, supra note ___, at 511-534; Lessig, The
Architecture of Privacy, supra note ___, at 63-64 (suggesting a combined arhictecture/market solution to
protecting privacy online, that relies in part on use of the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) designed
by the World Wide Web Consortium).
174
Lilian Edwards and Ian Brown, Data Control and Social Networking: Irreconcilable Ideas?, at
___ in ANDREA M MATWYSHYN (ed), HARBORING DATA: INFORMATION SECURITY, LAW AND THE
CORPORATION, forthcoming, 2008; SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 203-204.
175
Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note ___, at 33 (discussing the American Libraries
Association’s role of protecting patron’s rights and freedoms in the library bill of rights in 1939 as an
example of an institution playing a regulatory role in promoting individual privacy).
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(EFF)176, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC),177 and perhaps also academic
institutions.178 The remainder of this Part identifies the key features of each of these six
modalities, and ways in which they might interact to provide more effective protections
for online privacy.

A. LEGAL RULES
1. The Role of Law Online
[L]egal rules … play a large part in establishing the social context of privacy ….
[P]rivacy is not just an absence of information abroad about ourselves; it is a feeling of
security in control over that information. By using the public, impersonal and ultimate
institution of law to grant persons this control, we at once put the right to control as far
beyond question as we can and at the same time show how seriously we take that right.
- Professor Charles Fried179
Lawyers have a tendency to regard legal rules as the paramount – and sometimes
the only – solution to a problem.180 However, laws have limits, especially online. In
particular, effective enforcement mechanisms can be problematic where harmful conduct
involves anonymous wrongdoers who could be situated anywhere in the world.
Additionally, legislatures are often faced with complex policy choices in balancing
competing interests such as privacy, speech, and intellectual property rights online. The
novelty of much online conduct can exacerbate these difficulties. Governments often
look to social norms to discern an appropriate policy basis for new laws. In areas like
online social networking, where many social norms are not fully developed, governments
may have difficulty identifying appropriate directions for new laws.181 The legislature is
then faced with questions as to whether it should attempt to create and communicate new
norms through its laws, or to wait and see what norms develop before legislating.

176

The Electronic Frontier Foundation describes itself as: “leading civil liberties group defending
your rights in the digital world.” (see www.eff.org, last viewed on July 23, 2008).
177
The Electronic Privacy Information Center describes itself as: “a public interest research center in
Washington, D.C. It was established in 1994 to focus public attention on emerging civil liberties issues and
to protect privacy, the First Amendment, and constitutional values.” (see www.epic.org, last viewed on July
23, 2008). The identification of new forms of regulatory modality is not inconsistent with Professor
Lessig’s work – he did not intend for his four regulatory modalities to be the last word on cyberspace
regulation: LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note ___, at 123 (“Whether or not there are other constraints
(there may well be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the most
significant…”).
178
See discussion in Part IV.F infra.
179
Fried, surpa note ___, at 493.
180
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note ___, at 121 (“Law is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers at
least).”)
181
In contrast to this, some have argued that it is necessary for decision-makers, including
legislatures often to consider acting before social norms have developed because failure to do so may result
in an inability to effectively regulate inconsistently with norms where the need arises: Bernstein, New
Technologies, supra note ___, at 943-946 (including a discussion of entrenchment of anti-privacy norms on
the Internet in the context of electronic commerce).
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Legal rules are therefore unlikely to be the answer to online video privacy
problems.182 They will have an important place183 in the regulatory matrix, but they
cannot resolve online privacy issues on their own. The challenge for regulators will be to
identify exactly what role legal rules should play, and how those rules should interact
with other forms of regulation. Recently, commentators have suggested that online
privacy regulation could be improved if law: recognized privacy in public;184 better
protected confidential relationships;185 and allowed individuals to exercise greater control
over their personal information after it has been exposed to other people or even to the
general public.186 Various approaches to legal regulation might prove fruitful in the video
privacy context. Privacy law might usefully draw on some of the lessons learned from
digital copyright law and environmental regulation. Additionally, privacy torts could be
updated to better protect online video privacy. Law might also promote contractual and
technological solutions to online video privacy problems. The following discussion
considers each of these possibilities in turn.

2. Lessons from Digital Copyright Law
The case for drawing ideas from copyright law should not be overstated because
of concerns that copyright law has over-propertized online information in the digital
age.187 Nevertheless, there are some salient parallels between online privacy and the
protection of copyright works online.188 Copyright law has been very successful in
protecting copyrights in online video files despite early concerns about the ability of
copyright holders to exercise control over information in digital formats.189 Thus, the
copyright model counters the argument that it is impossible to regulate video files online
on the grounds that it is too difficult to obtain effective control over these files.190
182

SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note __, at 193 (“There is … a limit to how much
the law can do. The law is an instrument capable of subtle notes, but it is not quite a violin.”)
183
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note ___, at 123 (“While these four modalities are analytically
independent, law has a special role in affecting the three. The law, in other words, sometimes operates to
increase or decrease the constraint of a particular modality.”)
184
id, at 187. Professor Sánchez Abril has also noted that, while many traditional privacy laws are
premised on a distinction between public and private conduct, this distinction has become increasingly
blurred in the digital information age, which has caused expectations of privacy to become unstable and
difficult to ascertain: Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy, supra note ___, at 5-6. See also ZITTRAIN, supra
note ___, at 212 (“Even the use of “public” and “private” to describe our selves and spaces is not subtle
enough to express the kind of privacy we might want [online].”), 216 (“Peer-leveraging technologies are
overstepping the boundaries that laws and norms have defined as public and private, even as they are also
facilitating beneficial innovation.”).
185
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note __, at 187. See Richards and Solove, Privacy’s
Other Path, supra note ___.
186
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note __, at 188.
187
Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, 4.01 WIRED (Jan. 1996) (available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper.html, last viewed on July 23, 2008); LESSIG, FREE
CULTURE, supra note ___.
188
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note __, at 185.
189
id, at 184-186.
190
id., at 184 ([I]s control over information really feasible? If we expose information to others, isn’t
it too difficult for the law to allow us still to control it? Perhaps the law is reticent about granting control
because of the practical difficulties. Information spreads rapidly, sometimes like a virus, and it is not easily
contained.”)
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Copyright law will apply online regardless of whether the relevant information has been
accidentally exposed to the public,191 and even if the information is in a digital format that
can be readily copied.192 Thus, it is technically possible to enact a law that controls the
flow of video information online.
The similarities between copyright and privacy with respect to video files include
questions about: (a) how to effectively control access to, and use of, digitally available
information; (b) how to balance the rights of an information rights holder against
competing interests such as free speech and other legitimate uses;193 (c) what kinds of
liability, if any, should be faced by Internet intermediaries, such as Internet service
providers, for unauthorized activities of others;194 (d) how to identify appropriate forums
for dispute resolution in a global information society; (e) how to deal with global
disharmonization of relevant legal principles;195 (f) how to identify wrongdoers in a
largely anonymous online medium;196 and, (g) how to provide effective remedies for
harms arising from the viral online dissemination of protected information.197
Copyright law has also developed a notice and takedown regime to give rightsholders the ability to request removal of infringing material from websites.198 This law
also provides a safe harbor from secondary infringement liability for Internet

191

id, at 185 (“The copyright system focuses on the use of information – it allows certain uses and
prohibits others. And it does so regardless of whether the information has been publicly exposed.”)
192
id. (“[C]opyright law provides protection even when a work can be readily copied. I don’t have to
take any steps to protect my work.”)
193
Legitimate uses might include those traditionally associated with copyright law such as news
reporting on matters of public interest, and some non profit educational uses. In the privacy context,
certain kinds of data aggregation might also be legitimate uses if appropriate safeguards against
unauthorized privacy invasions are implemented. See, for example, Whalen v Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)
(upholding law requiring computerized data aggregation of information relating to prescription of certain
medications, and acknowledging that appropriate information security safeguards were in place).
194
Professor Solove notes that copyright law provides liability when third parties facilitate a
copyright violation: SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 185.
195
For example, the European Union and United States take very different approaches to privacy.
The European Union approach is largely codified in Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data (the “Data Protection Directive”). The United States, on the
other hand, takes a more piecemeal approach to private data protection: RAYMOND KU AND JACQUELINE
LIPTON, CYBERSPACE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 544 (2 ed, 2006) (“[T]o date, the United States
largely relies upon unfair and deceptive business practice law and self-regulation [to protect privacy]. In
contrast, other nations, and most notably, the European Union have taken more aggressive steps to protect
individual privacy in data collection.”)
196
17 U.S.C. § 512 allows copyright holders, for example, to seek identifying information about
alleged copyright infringers from third party services providers. See also In re Verizon Internet Services,
Inc, 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003) (Internet service provider (“ISP”) challenging subpoena served on
it by the Recording Industry Association of America seeking identifying information for alleged copyright
infringers utilizing the ISP’s services.)
197
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 184-5 (noting that copyright law will
provide remedies even when information has been exposed to public view and has not been protected by
the information holder against potential viral distribution).
198
17 U.S.C. 512 (c).
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intermediaries such as OSNs.199 The notice and takedown idea could be extended to the
privacy context if personal privacy rights are to be strengthened in digital video images.
Of course, such an approach would have to take into account the potential chilling impact
on free speech. Safeguards would need to be built into the system to ensure that the
notice and takedown mechanism was not used frivolously to the detriment of online
expression. However, there would likely be less risk of frivolous takedown notices in the
privacy context, involving private individuals’ reputations, than in the copyright context
where powerful corporate copyright holders seem to resort to the takedown regime even
in the absence of a serious likelihood that a copyright infringement has occurred.200
Although digital copyright law may be a useful model for enhanced online
privacy protections, it needs to be kept in mind that parallels between copyright and
privacy are not perfect. The constitutional underpinnings for copyrights and privacy are
quite different. Copyright law has clear and express origins in the federal Constitution,201
while informational privacy does not.202 Thus, the online protection of copyrights by
Congress is more easily justified in the face of First Amendment concerns than the
protection of privacy. Additionally, copyright law in the digital age has created its own
imbalances,203 and these should be avoided in enhancing any legal protections for online
privacy.204

3. Lessons from Environmental Regulation
Environmental regulation is another area of law that may prove instructive for
online privacy, at least with respect to the role that OSN providers might play. There has
199

id. The privacy analog to this would be § 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996,
effectively immunizing ISPs for tort liability for speech posted by others utilizing their services.
200
See, for example, discussion in Jennifer Urban and Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling
Effects”? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621 (2006); MICHELE BOLDRIN and DAVID K LEVINE, AGAINST
INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY, 108-110 (2008) (describing abuses of notice and takedown procedure by
powerful corporate copyright holders).
201
Art. I, Section 8, Clause 8 (granting the Congress power: “To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”)
202
Limited privacy rights have been implied into various constitutional clauses, but there is no
express grant of power for Congress to protect privacy: DANIEL SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG AND PAUL
SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW (2 ed, 2006) (“Although the United States Constitution does not
specifically mention privacy, it has a number of provisions that protect privacy, and it has been interpreted
as providing a right to privacy.”)
203
Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, 4.01 WIRED (Jan. 1996) (available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper.html, last viewed on July 23, 2008); LESSIG, FREE
CULTURE, supra note ___; BOLDRIN and LEVINE, supra note ___, at 108-120.
204
Of course even digital copyright law has been bolstered in many respects by contract law and
technical standards: Michael Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67
FORDHAM L REV 1025 (1998) (discussing uses of contractual and technological measures with copyright
law in attempts by copyright holders to protect their rights online). This is another example of an important
and necessary interaction between distinct regulatory modalities – contract, architecture (technology) and
law. Privacy law advocates considering these interactions today have an opportunity to achieve a better
balance of interests in the wake of some of the arguable failures of digital copyright law.
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been a growing trend in information privacy law to look to models of environmental
regulation as a basis for ascertaining best practices for online privacy.205 Commentators
have noted the ways in which environmental law has moved away from command and
control models206 towards second generation initiatives that encourage regulated parties
to choose for themselves the means by which they will achieve regulatory goals.207
These approaches could be adapted to online privacy.208 In effect, law can be utilized as
a means to foster the development of market forces that promote the kinds of privacy
goals society would ideally require online. Laws could set goals of best practices for
OSNs in protecting and enforcing individual privacy in terms of things like the drafting
and enforcement of their terms of use and privacy policies, and their willingness to
incorporate privacy-enhancing technologies into their services.209 Here, we potentially
see a complex interplay of social norms, laws, market forces, and system architecture in
achieving desired privacy outcomes.

4. Privacy and Publicity Torts
Privacy torts seem to be the most obvious approach to the legal regulation of
online privacy. However, as currently framed, they have significant limitations, most of
which have been identified above.210 The Restatement (Second) of Torts currently
recognizes four distinct privacy torts.211 Unfortunately, they are uncohesive in terms of
coverage and have been criticized by free speech advocates.212 Nevertheless, some of the
privacy torts could be modified to better accommodate the realities of online conduct
involving video content. Professor Sánchez Abril has suggested strengthening the tort
relating to public disclosure of private facts213 to operate more effectively in the OSN
205

Dennis D Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation can Learn from
Environmental Law, 41 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW 1 (2006); Deirdre Mulligan and Joseph Simitian, Assessing
Security Breach Notification Laws, work in progress, copy on file with the author.
206
Hirsch, supra note ___, at 8; Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and Regulatory Choice, 82
NOTRE DAME L REV 313, 320 (2006) (explaining command and control regulatory approach in the
environmental context as a government setting a particular standard with which targeted actors are required
to comply
207
Hirsch, supra note ___, at 8.
208
id., at 23 (“The privacy injuries of the Information Age are structurally similar to the
environmental damage of the smokestack era. Two key concepts that have bee used to understand
environmental damage – the “negative externality” and the “tragedy of the commons” – also shed light on
privacy issues.”); 63 (identifying other similarities between environmental regulation and information
regulation, including the fact that market players regulated by both areas of law: “undergo rapid change,
face stiff competition, and have the capacity for socially beneficial innovation.”)
209
The kinds of technologies that might be incorporated into OSN services in this respect are taken
up in more detail in Part IV.A.6 infra.
210
See discussion in Part II.A.2 supra.
211
Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 652A-E (1997).
212
Zimmerman, Requiem, supra note ___ (suggesting that torts prohibiting true speech cannot be
reconciled with the First Amendment); Volokh, supra note ___ (suggesting that tortious approaches to
protecting privacy cannot be reconciled with the First Amendment, but that contractual approaches may
avoid this criticism).
213
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652D (“One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the
private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized
is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to
the public.”)
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context.214 She notes that the public disclosure tort developed at a time when the law was
concerned with intrusions into physical spaces.215 It is therefore not well suited to virtual
environments.216 She suggests re-focusing enquiries about public versus private
activities, in the context of this tort, to better meet the needs of the information society.
Notably, she advocates: (a) thinking about zones of confidentiality created by system
architecture, agreements and relationship bonds, rather than physical walls;217 (b)
categorizing privacy harms that ensue from information disclosure rather than
categorizing certain subject matter as per se private;218 and (c) thinking in terms of
overall accessibility of online information rather than in terms of whether it was
completely secret or secluded.219
Related to the privacy torts is the right of publicity tort. In fact, the publicity tort
closely tracks one of the privacy torts – the misappropriation tort.220 Both torts prevent
the use of someone else’s name or likeness for financial benefit.221 Thus, neither tort
effectively covers unauthorized posting and dissemination of photographs on OSNs.
Most of these uses are not for commercial gain, but merely for amusement and
discussion.222 The misappropriation-based torts might be expanded to help individuals
control uses and dissemination of their images online:223 for example, they could cover
unauthorized disseminations of an individual’s image even in the absence of a profit
motive. Of course, there would have to be some counterbalancing forces put in place to
ensure that speech was not unnecessarily chilled: for example, a broadened noncommercial appropriation tort might apply online only “when people’s photos are used in
ways that are not of public concern.”224
The four American privacy torts also suffer from some common limitations.
Plaintiffs are put in the awkward position of having to relive the humiliation and
embarrassment of the images as they are entered into the public record as part of the court
214

Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy, supra note __.
id, at 2 (“[P]rivacy is usually a function of the physical space in which the purportedly private
activity occurred.”); 3 (“Traditionally, privacy has been inextricably linked to physical space.”)
216
id, at 4 (concepts of physical space are no longer relevant in analyzing modern online privacy
harms).
217
id., at 47.
218
id.
219
id.
220
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652C (“One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name
or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.”)
221
GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1] (“The right of publicity … is the right of an
individual to control the commercial use of his or her name, likeness, signature, or other personal
characteristics.”). See also MILLS, supra note ___, at 173-177 (discussing technical differences between
the privacy misappropriation tort and the right of publicity tort).
222
GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1]. (“The appropriation tort would rarely
apply to the discussion on the Internet of people’s private lives or the posting of their photos.”) Of course,
it is arguable that the OSN provider’s complicity in the posting might amount to financial profit motives if
the OSN provider is deriving financial profit from advertising related to the online posting of video content.
This proposition remains to be tested.
223
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 187 (“The appropriation tort might be
expanded to encompass a broader set of problematic uses of information about a person …”)
224
id.
215
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proceedings.225 To add insult to injury, the plaintiff will have to pay a lawyer for the
privilege of reliving this embarrassment. Additionally, domestic laws will always raise
jurisdictional difficulties online, as compared with, say, technological solutions or
contracts that specify choice of forum and choice of law.226

5. Privacy Contracts and Breach of Confidence Actions
Express or implied contracts and breach of confidence actions might also assist in
the video privacy context. These issues are treated together here because they all rely on
relationships. Express or implied contracts arise from the conduct of the parties and their
intention to enter into legally binding obligations. Breach of confidence actions can arise
from contract law or can be imposed externally to protect a relationship that the law
deems to require a high duty of confidentiality. Examples are the doctor-patient
relationship and the preacher-penitent relationship.227 Relationships that give rise to legal
obligations of confidence can be useful models for privacy regulation.228 However, peerbased video privacy incursions do not generally involve relationships that the law would
today regard as involving legal obligations of confidence. Of course, it is possible to
expand the categories of confidential relationships recognized by the law. The question
would be how best to achieve this. Express contracts of confidentiality might be
problematic. It is unlikely that private individuals taking pictures of each other and
posting them online have the time, inclination, or experience to enter into contracts to
protect each other’s privacy. However, implied contracts recognized by the legal system
might be a viable alternative.
Commentators have recognized that implied contracts, and even express
contracts, can be utilized in interpersonal relationships for legal enforcement of privacy
and confidentiality expectations online.229 Professors Sánchez Abril and Cava have
suggested that an express promise of confidentiality between private individuals in
225

MILLS, supra note ___, at 53-4 (describing additional privacy problems raised by the availability
of court records on the Internet).
226
Such contracts are generally upheld in the online context. See, for example, Caspi v The
Microsoft Network, 323 N.J. Sup. 118 (App. Div. 1999).
227
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note ___, at 214 (giving examples of relationships of
confidence protected by legal rules, including attorney/client, priest/penitent, husband/wife, and,
psychotherapist/patient).
228
As early as 1968, for example, Professor Charles Fried noted the importance of focusing on
privacy expectations within personal relationships: Fried, supra note ___, at 482 (“In general it is my
thesis that in developed social contexts love, friendship and trust are only possible if persons enjoy and
accord to each other a certain measure of privacy.”)
229
See Abril and Cava, supra note ___, at 268 (“Online, express confidentiality agreements are a
more tenable solution. Facilitated through available technology, confidentiality agreements between users
could assure a higher level of protection for those sharing private and personal information. In some
instances, confidentiality agreements have been offered through online health ISPs as a prerequisite to
membership. PatientsLikeMe.com includes such a clause as part of its terms of use. It states: “You agree
not to disclose to any person or entity personally identifiable information about other members that you
learn using this Site (whether posted in the Member Area by a member or emailed to you by a member)
without the express consent of such member. You may disclose information of a general nature (that could
not identify the member who provided such information or whom such information is about) to third parties
outside this Site, subject to the above restriction on non-commercial use.”).
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respect of health care information could be built into online health care architectures.230
Professor McClurg has suggested the development of implied contracts of confidentiality
for intimate relationships generally.231 His suggestion contemplates protection for both
textual information shared in confidence and for video information pertaining to the
relationship.232 His ideas could be extended to social relationships more broadly.
Professor Volokh suggests that express or implied contracts of confidentiality are
the only legal method of avoiding First Amendment problems.233 However, he identifies
two important limitations on contract-based solutions that may have particular resonance
in cyberspace. The first is that contractual enforcement will generally not apply to third
parties, unless, for example, the third party can be found to be an agent of one of the
contracting parties.234 In the OSN situation, people disseminating each other’s images
online may not be in any kind of relationship with an image subject let alone a
contractual relationship. The second limitation of contractual solutions is that contracts
cannot be enforced against minors.235 This may be a significant problem in the OSN
context because presumably many people sharing images online are minors.
Some commentators have suggested the extension of breach of confidence actions
to better protect privacy.236 For example, British law currently protects a greater array of
relationships of confidence than American law.237 American tort law could be extended
to cover a greater variety of relationships of confidence, particularly online. Such an
approach may again be less objectionable on First Amendment grounds than reliance on
extending privacy torts because rights arising from relationships are not enforceable
against the whole world.238 Of course, one limitation of the breach of confidence
230

id, at 276 (“Cyber-patients have the duty of confidentiality to fellow patients. All information
disclosed on health networking websites is privy and not to be divulged or otherwise disseminated. Users
should not disclose any information obtained through the website unless specifically authorized. Similarly,
disclosing cyber-patients should be as clear as possible regarding the level of confidentiality they expect.
Cyber-patients have the duty to obtain the consent of family members and others whose health information
they disclose. Relevant information regarding the health of family members is a vital part of a complete
medical record. However, cyber-patients must understand these individuals also have rights to privacy in
their health information. Cyber-patients must, therefore, obtain the informed consent of their family
members before posting such information on the website.”).
231
McClurg, supra note ___.
232
id., at 887-888 (giving examples of online text-based and video disseminations of confidential
information).
233
Volokh, supra note ___, at 1062 (“I certainly do not claim that a contractual approach to
information privacy, even with a large dollop of implied contract, is a panacea for information privacy
advocates …. I claim only that contractual solutions are a constitutional alternative and may be the only
constitutional alternative, not that they are always a particularly satisfactory alternative.”); Zimmerman,
Requiem, supra note ___, at 363 (suggesting looking into contractual solutions for protecting privacy rather
than tort law).
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Volokh, supra note ___, at 1061.
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id., at 1063.
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Richards and Solove, Privacy’s Other Path, supra note ___.
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id., at 158-160 (2007); SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 137 (“England,
which rejects Warren and Brandeis’s privacy torts, recognizes a breach-of-confidence tort. Unlike the
American version, which applies only in a few narrow contexts, the English tort applies much more
generally and extends even to spouses and lovers.”)
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Richards and Solove, Privacy’s Other Path, supra note ___178-181.
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approach is that, even a broadened concept of relationships of confidence will not cover
situations such as dog poop girl and Bus Uncle where there is no relationship at all
between the image taker and the image subject, other than that they happen to be sharing
a mode of public transportation.

6. Legislating Codes of Conduct and Technical Standards
Legal rules might also enhance privacy by encouraging the adoption of certain
social behaviors and technical standards.239 Here, we are talking about legislating best
practices to encourage either markets or individuals, or both, to behave in a particular
way to better protect online privacy. Legislation might be targeted at OSNs with respect
to best practices for default privacy settings.240 This might involve requiring OSNs to
incorporate technological privacy protections by default, such as refusing access by one
user to another’s information without asking the second user a series of security questions
and having her check a permissions screen.241 Another example would be requiring
OSNs to set their systems to prevent copying and pasting of digital information and
images unless a particular user opted to allow her images to be copied by others.242
Legal rules do not only shape behavior through enforcement – or the threat of
enforcement. They also serve a communicative function about appropriate online
conduct.243 They can thus reflect, and in some cases even direct, the development of
social norms. In the video privacy context, law will be an important piece of the
regulatory matrix both by punishing inappropriate behaviors, and by signaling the
contours of acceptable behaviors. However, law cannot operate in a vacuum. The
following discussion considers the other five regulatory modalities that must interact with
law to achieve an effective regulatory matrix.

239

This is an extension of the idea of drawing on the environmental regulation model to encourage
markets, and in this case individuals as well, to behave in a particular way.
240
Edwards and Brown, supra note ___ (Drawing on the experience of the Directive on Privacy and
Electronic Communications in the European Union - Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in
the electronic communications sector (available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_201/l_20120020731en00370047.pdf, last viewed on July 24, 2008) –
Professors Edwards and Brown suggest that legislating mandatory privacy default settings may prove more
effective in protecting individual privacy than leaving the market to its own devices.)
241
This is effectively what many closed networks do now. Facebook, for example, does not let a user
access another’s profile unless the second user accepts the first as a “friend”.
242
Of course, for privacy protection purposes, this would require permission of the image subject as
well as potentially the image owner which could be technically unwieldy in practice.
243
See, for example, Fried, supra note ___, at 493 (“By using the public, impersonal and ultimate
institution of law to grant persons this control, we at once put the right to control as far beyond question as
we can and at the same time show how seriously we take that right.”)
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B. SOCIAL NORMS
Social norms are an extremely important form of regulation.244 Norms may be
defined as rules that are: “diffusely enforced by third parties other than state agents by
means of social sanctions.”245 Norms can be more significant than laws,246 particularly in
areas that involve high levels of social interaction,247 like privacy. The problem with
cyberspace is that many norms are not yet well developed. Particularly in relation to
OSNs, norm development is in its infancy because of the relative novelty of social
networking technology. This state of affairs contains both advantages and disadvantages
for privacy advocates. Advantages include the ability to make privacy-protecting
regulatory decisions before privacy-destroying norms become entrenched. However,
disadvantages include the difficulties of ascertaining appropriate levels of privacy
protection in the absence of clearer information about social expectations. This paradox
is not new in the online privacy context.248 However, it requires serious thought by
decision-makers before potentially harmful norms become entrenched.249
Globalization also raises difficulties of identifying and enforcing norms online.
Are we talking about one global society’s norms? Or rather an overlapping group of
online societies, like the overlapping networks of “friends” on an OSN? Yet another
problem of identifying privacy norms online relates to the ambiguity or cognitive
disconnect that arises when people are surveyed about online privacy. In the few surveys
that have been conducted on attitudes to online privacy, respondents generally rate the
idea of privacy in the abstract very highly.250 However, they are prepared to bargain with
their privacy for a very small price.251 An online shopping coupon may well entice an
individual to disclose voluminous personal details with little regard to future uses of that
information.252
244

SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 93 (“One of the primary ways that society
intervenes in people’s lives is through the enforcement of norms.”)
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Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, supra note ___, at 62 (“[Norms] are different from law – they
are enforced … not by the state, but by the sanctions of other members of a particular community. But they
are nonetheless a source of constraint, functioning to protect privacy.”)
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Strandburg, supra note ___, at 1248.
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id.
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See discussion in Bernstein, New Technologies, supra note ___ (describing similar dynamics with
respect to commercial transactions on the Internet and data aggregation by Internet commerce companies).
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id.
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SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 73 (citing the work of economists
Alessandro Acquisti and Jens Grossklags); Eric Goldman, On My Mind: The Privacy Hoax, available at
http://www.ericgoldman.org/Articles/privacyhoax.htm, last viewed on July 24, 2008 (“But what do these
surveys really prove? Consumers may tell survey takers they fear for their privacy, but their behavior belies
it. People don't read privacy policies, for example. In a survey taken last year by the Privacy Leadership
Initiative, a group of corporate and trade association executives, only 3% of consumers read privacy
policies carefully, and 64% only glanced at--or never read--privacy policies.”).
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id.
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SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note ___, at 87 (“Since people routinely give out their
personal information for shopping discount cards, for access to websites, and even for free, some market
proponents (especially the self-regulators) argue that the value of the data is very low to the individuals.”);
Froomkin, supra note ___, at 1502 (“[C]onsumers suffer from privacy myopia: they will sell their data too
often and too cheaply. Modest assumptions about consumer privacy myopia suggest that even Americans
who place a high value on information privacy will sell their privacy bit by bit for frequent flyer miles.”)
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So how do we identify and enforce social norms as they relate to content,
particularly video content, shared over OSNs? Some empirical work may be helpful,
although to date empirical work has had its limits because individuals typically
undervalue their personal information.253 There is an argument that empirical work may
suffer less from this problem in the OSN context than in the textual data aggregation
context. In the latter context, where much of the survey work has been done so far,
consumers’ abstract expectations of privacy are often not aligned with their behavior
when faced with the choice of trading their information for some minor commercial
benefit, such as online shopping coupons or frequent flyer miles. In the online video
context, on the other hand, there is little prospect of individuals bargaining with their
personal information for any commercial benefit because their transactions are generally
social rather than commercial. Thus, self-reported survey results about privacy
expectations in OSNs may be more appropriately aligned with the way people actually
behave. Another possible method of identifying emerging privacy norms online is to
consider blog postings and associated comments that deal with privacy issues. More and
more often, online privacy incursions are reported on blogs, and various individuals will
comment about related expectations of privacy.254 A comprehensive survey of some of
these postings may illuminate prevailing societal views about privacy, and identify areas
in which norms are still developing.
If it is possible to ascertain any social expectations about online privacy in the
OSN context, these could usefully be reduced to Internet guidelines, akin to the way that
netiquette developed in the early days of the Internet. Netiquette has been defined as “the
growing body of acceptable, though as yet largely unwritten, etiquette with respect to
conduct by users of the Internet”.255 In the early days of the Internet, netiquette generally
referred to attempts to articulate appropriate social norms with respect to the new email
technologies available at the time.256
Private organizations or individuals who may have a stake in the future operation
of OSNs might encourage the articulation of netiquette principles for OSNs that take
There are other alternative explanations for consumers failing to act in privacy protecting ways online:
Bernstein, Paradoxes, supra note ___, at 290 (suggesting that consumers are actually unaware of the extent
of privacy threats accordingly online which leads them to fail to adequately protect their privacy using
already available technological tools and social behaviors).
253
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note ___, at 87; Froomkin, supra note ___, at 1502.
254
For an example of this, see Owen Thomas, Your Privacy is an Illusion: Bank Intern Busted by
Facebook (Gawker, November 17, 2007, available at http://valleywag.gawker.com/321802/tech/yourprivacy-is-an-illusion/bank-intern-busted-by-facebook, last viewed on January 23, 2009) (example of
employer finding image on Facebook of employee at a Halloween party on a day when employee was
allegedly out of the office for a family emergency – and associated comment on the story by web users).
255
1267623 Ontario Inc v Nexx Online Inc, [1999] O.J. No. 2246 (Court File No. C20546/99, Ontario
Superior Court of Justice, Toronto, Ontario, June 14, 1999) (“[Netiquette] is defined as the growing body
of acceptable, though as yet largely unwritten, etiquette with respect to conduct by users of the Internet.”)
256
In 1995, for example, Intel promulgated a set of guidelines in the form of a generally available
memo for the Internet community. These “Netiquette Guidelines”256 contained suggestions about
appropriate use of email services for the then-new generation of Internet users who had not “grown up with
the Internet”: Intel, Netiquette Guidelines, available at http://www.albury.net.au/new-users/rfc1855.txt, last
viewed on July 18, 2008.

38

Developing a Privacy Paradigm for Digital Video
privacy into account. Indeed, many OSN service providers currently do incorporate
privacy provisions into their terms of use.257 However, there are problems with
enforcement of these terms generally,258 and with the fact that many victims of privacy
incursions are not parties to these contracts.259 Some OSNs have privacy policies that
resemble attempts to articulate new forms of netiquette.260 These are generally available
statements of best practices by an OSN provider about its aspirations to appropriately
protect user privacy.261 However, terms of use and privacy policies differ from netiquette
and social norms in the sense that they are generally written from the point of view of an
OSN provider, not the individuals using the service. Thus, they focus on what the service
provider will or will not do with personal information, rather than with the kind of respect
individual users of the service should pay to each other’s privacy. Emerging online
norms, or netiquette, must take account of both the appropriate behavior of OSN
providers vis-à-vis private individuals, and the appropriate behavior of individuals
amongst themselves.262
Some OSNs attempt to outline a form of netiquette, describing ways in which
users of their services should treat each other. YouTube and Flickr each have a set of
“Community Guidelines” along these lines.263 The Community Guidelines cover issues
like ensuring that no inappropriate content is posted, and remembering that children may
be looking at information and video files. They additionally include terms like: “Flickr
is not a venue for you to harass, abuse, impersonate, or intimidate others. If we receive a
valid complaint about your conduct, we’ll send you a warning or terminate your
account”.264 Flickr also includes the simple suggestion: “Don’t be creepy.”265 The
guidelines do not say anything about protecting others’ privacy rights, although they do
talk about respecting others’ copyrights.266
257

See discussion in Part II.B supra.
id.
259
id.
260
See, for example, Facebook’s Privacy Policy, available at http://www.facebook.com/policy.php,
last viewed on July 18, 2008.
261
id.
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Intel’s Netiquette Guidelines focus on behavior amongst individuals using text-based electronic
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behavioral equation. See, for example, clause 1.0 (“Individuals should be aware that no matter who
supplies their Internet access, be it an Internet Service Provider through a private account, or a student
account at a University, or an account through a corporation, that those organizations have regulations
about ownership of mail and files, about what is proper to post or send, and how to present yourself. Be
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Flickr Community Guidelines, available at http://www.flickr.com/guidelines.gne, last viewed on
July 22, 2008; YouTube Community Guidelines, available at
http://www.youtube.com/t/community_guidelines, last viewed on July 22, 2008. In fact, Flickr expresses
that its Community Guidelines are part of its terms of use so they may have contractual force as well as
reflecting desired social norms: Flickr Community Guidelines, supra note ___, (“Don’t forget that your
use of Flickr is subject to these Guidelines and our Terms of Use.”)
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id.
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id.
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id. In particular, Flickr suggests ways of amicably resolving copyright disputes by encouraging
first that a complainant privately contact the alleged copyright violator. Then, if that does not succeed, the
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39

Developing a Privacy Paradigm for Digital Video

Flickr’s Community Guidelines also ask users of the service not to “upload
anything that isn’t theirs”.267 However, closer inspection of the relevant clause suggests
that this is geared towards copyright protection rather than privacy protection. The
definition of “stuff that isn’t yours” states that: “This includes other people’s photos,
video and/or stuff you've collected from around the Internet.” The possessive pronoun
here relates to “photos, videos and other stuff”, suggesting that it is the ownership of a
digital image that is important to Flickr, rather than the holder of privacy interests in the
image. In other words, where the photographer is a different person to the photographic
subject, it would seem that Flickr’s guidelines only contemplate protection of the
photographer’s rights in the image, not the rights of the photographic subject.268
In contrast to services like Flickr and YouTube, some of the closed networks like
MySpace and Facebook do not have specific sets of Community Guidelines outside of
their standard terms of use and privacy policies. This may be because their users are
automatically regarded as having more control of content because of the closed nature of
the network. Thus, there is less perceived need to promulgate a set of Community
Guidelines.269 In other words, if users are able to limit views of their content to “friends”
authorized to access their profiles, then there is less need for the service provider to
promulgate a set of rules about how community members should treat each other.
Community members can rely on the technical defaults they set to limit uses others may
make of their information.270

complainant is requested to file a notice of infringement with the “Yahoo! Copyright Team” who will
resolve the matter. Their Community Guidelines state that: “If you see photos or videos that you’ve
created in another member’s photostream, don't panic. This is probably just a misunderstanding and not
malicious. A good first step is to contact them and politely ask them to remove it. If that doesn't work,
please file a Notice of Infringement with the Yahoo! Copyright Team who will take it from there. You may
be tempted to post an entry on your photostream or in our public forum about what's happening, but that's
not the best way to resolve a possible copyright problem. We don't encourage singling out individuals like
this on Flickr.”
267
Flickr Community Guidelines, supra note ___.
268
YouTube’s community guidelines similarly protect copyright, but do not specifically mention
privacy interests: YouTube Community Guidelines, supra note ___, (“Respect copyright. Only upload
videos that you made or that you are authorized to use. This means don't upload videos you didn't make, or
use content in your videos that someone else owns the copyright to, such as music tracks, snippets of
copyrighted programs, or videos made by other users, without necessary authorizations. Read our
Copyright Tips for more information.”)
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This assertion may find support in the fact that one of the most “open” of all networks, the
Wikipedia, has an extremely detailed set of guidelines referred to as “Wikiquette” to assist people posting
information to behave appropriately vis-à-vis other posters. See Wikipedia: Etiquette, available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Etiquette, last viewed on July 23, 2008; CASS SUNSTEIN,
INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE, 155 (2006) (“When active debates are occurring
about the content of articles, it is necessary to have good norms to provide some discipline. The term
“Wikiquette” refers to the etiquette that Wikipedians follow. Wikiquette helps to ensure that the active
debates are transferred to separate “talk pages.” These are the deliberative forums on Wikipedia, in which
those who disagree explain the basis for their disagreement. What is noteworthy is that the articles
themselves are (mostly) solid, and that partisan debats have a specifically designed location.”)
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ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 226 (“Facebook, for example, offers tools to label the photographs
one submits and to indicate what groups of people can and cannot see them.”)
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Of course, this is only true to a point, but it may explain the difference between
open and closed networks in terms of the perceived need to articulate Community
Guidelines.271 Paradoxically, users of closed OSNs such as Facebook may be particularly
vulnerable to unbridled dissemination of their personal information and images due to
developing norms against rejecting requests from people who want to “friend” you
online.272 Norms also appear to be developing that you cannot “unfriend” someone once
you have accepted them as a friend.273 Thus, the apparent control a user has on Facebook
over who accesses their information may be much more illusory than it appears.
Outside the OSN context, the “spoiler” communities that investigate likely
outcomes of reality television shows provide some useful examples of emerging online
norms about privacy. One example involves the online communities that privately
investigate likely contestants and outcomes on the popular Survivor television series.274
These communities try to ascertain the identities of contestants on upcoming series of
Survivor, the locations in which upcoming series will be filmed, and the order in which
contestants will be voted off the program.275 Of course, attempts to investigate the lives
of actual contestants tread a fine line between legitimate fan interest in the program and
invading the privacy of the contestants.276 One norm that has developed within the
Survivor spoiler community is the use of “brain trusts”.277 These are small subsets of the
spoiler community who conduct much of the detailed investigation of contestants through
encrypted websites that are not accessible to the general online community.278 Part of the
aim here is to protect the privacy of the contestants, as well as ensuring a higher degree of
accuracy once the brain trust posts its findings to the general community.279 The use of
encryption technology to protect discussions implicating contestants’ privacy suggests an
intriguing interplay between developing privacy norms and system architecture.
All of these examples evidence ways in which online communities are beginning
to develop and recognize privacy norms, including norms relating to video files. Thus, it
may now be time to take stock of video privacy norms, and to attempt to ascertain where
laws, technologies, and market practices, are lagging behind community expectations of
privacy. For example, there currently appear to be no prevailing rules about the
271

Norms may also play a part in this distinction. Those posting to YouTube may expect public
availability of content, while those posting in closed networks expect more privacy protections.
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CORY DOCTOROW, CONTENT, 183 (2008) (“It’s socially awkward to refuse to add someone to your
friends list – but removing someone from your friends list is practically a declaration of war.”)
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id.
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and its development, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Survivor_(US_TV_series), last viewed on December
10, 2008. See also HENRY JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE: WHERE OLD AND NEW MEDIA COLLIDE, 25
(2006) (describing Survivor as a popular CBS show that started the reality television trend).
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JENKINS, supra note ___, 25-26.
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id., 36-7 (“[T]here is a thin, thin line between investigating those who have chosen to insert
themselves into the public spotlight and stalking them at their home or workplace …. The community
spends a great deal of time debating, exactly where you draw the line.”)
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id, 38.
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id.
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id. (“The brain trusts … argue that this closed-door vetting process protects privacy and ensures a
high degree of accuracy once they do post their findings.”)
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“tagging”280 of photographs to make them more easily searchable.281 Salient issues about
appropriate regulation here would be whether there are any identifiable norms relating to
the impact tagging might have on individual privacy. Even if an individual has consented
to the posting of her image on Facebook, and acknowledges the possibility that others
may see it and copy it, does that necessarily mean that she consents to tagging which
enables easier and potentially larger scale searching and copying of the image?282 It
would be interesting to find out how OSN users feel about this issue.283 Norms could
then be calibrated with legal rules that encourage best practices in technologies, online
contracting, and other market and social practices.

C. MARKET FORCES
Market forces often go hand in hand with social norms. Social desires and
expectations dictate, to a certain extent, what the market is able to sell, and perhaps
paradoxically, the market can dictate social norms through the nature of its products and
services.284 If all market players provide products that are limited to a given sub-set of
possible social behaviors then social behaviors will, by default, have to conform to what
is available in the market. However, if consumers are not happy with the available
choices, they may either refuse to buy a service at all, or they may petition the service
provider to change the service to better conform to their expectations. The immediate
user backlash against Facebook’s “Beacon” advertising scheme launched in late 2007 is
an example of consumers demanding changes to an online service to better suit their
privacy expectations.285
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“Tags” are currently defined by Wikipedia as follows: “A tag is a non-hierarchical keyword or
term assigned to a piece of information (such as an internet bookmark, digital image, or computer file).
This kind of metadata helps describe an item and allows it to be found again by browsing or searching.
Tags are chosen informally and personally by the item's creator or by its viewer, depending on the system.
On a website in which many users tag many items, this collection of tags becomes a folksonomy.” (see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tag_(metadata), last viewed on February 1, 2009).
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Edwards and Brown, supra note ___, at [10-17 of draft].
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Of course, tagging also potentially assists with searching and removal of content where an image
subject might have objected to its online dissemination, so the technology cuts both ways here.
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Professor Zittrain has noted that tagging may only be the beginning of the problem for online
image privacy as facial recognition software becomes more sophisticated and video images can now be
matched quite easily with tagged text descriptions: ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 214 (“Web sites like Riya,
Polar Rose, and MyHeritage are perfecting facial recognition technologies so that once photos of a
particular person are tagged a few times with his or her name, their computers can then automatically label
all future photos that include the person – even if their image appears in the background.”)
284
This is not unlike the way that law can communicate norms, but law can also enforce norms. The
interplay between modes of regulation can be quite complex and paradoxical at times.
285
The Beacon program involved divulging to a user’s “friends” what products the user had bought
online on the basis that the user’s friends may be interested in similar products. See discussion in William
McGeveran, Facebook Retreats Somewhat on Beacon Privacy, Info/Law, December 2, 2007 (available at
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2007/12/02/facebook-retreats-socialads/, last viewed on July 24,
2008); SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note ___, at 80 (citing various examples of online service
provides cancelling initiatives due to public outcry about privacy, including Yahoo! eliminating a reverse
telephone number search from its People Search site).
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Commentators have been skeptical about the inclination of markets to regulate
online privacy.286 The Internet allows market players to make gains from individuals’
personal information with very little legal recourse available for loss of privacy. Where
are the incentives for market players to protect privacy in the absence of government
regulation?287 Maybe in the situations under discussion in this article industry selfregulation might fare better than it has in the context of text-based data aggregation. In
the OSN context, at least as relates to video images, we are not talking about information
that has commercial value when aggregated into large databases.288 While textual
information from a personal profile on Facebook might be of interest to online marketers,
video information is less likely to have any significant appeal. Even if it were possible to
utilize images to ascertain whether an image subject might be interested in a certain style
of clothing, for example, the difficulties in processing video information in a way that
easily identifies the subject’s details for targeted advertising purposes likely outweigh
any commensurate benefits of doing so, at least on the basis of today’s technology.
Because of these attributes of online video, it is arguable that the interests of OSN
service providers and their users in terms of privacy protection are not so disparate. If
OSN service providers obtain more commercial value by protecting their users’ privacy
than by failing to do so, there may be sufficient market incentives for those service
providers to compete with each other in offering privacy protections to their users.
Facebook, for example, does offer stronger privacy protections in relation to video files
than some of its competitors.289 However, the fact that it has strongly worded privacy
protections in its terms of use does not necessarily mean that it enforces them in practice.
Facebook is also interesting in that it markets itself as having strong privacy protections.
Nevertheless, it has been criticized for attempts to utilize information derived from its
users to market items to their online “friends”.290
This evidences a distinct practical problem with over-reliance on markets as
privacy regulators. What an entity says it does, and what it actually does may be two
different things. An OSN provider can use promises of privacy to entice users to accept
its services, and then can fail to live up to those promises even to the extent of engaging
286
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July 24, 2008).

43

Developing a Privacy Paradigm for Digital Video
in conduct that completely contradicts its promises.291 In a perfect market, the consumer
would simply take her business elsewhere. Yet, in online markets there is often no
competitive “elsewhere” to go – and the transaction costs of moving all of your personal
information to another OSN are high292 relative to the benefits of doing so. If you want to
interact socially online, you may have little real choice between service providers.
There are a number of other difficulties with reliance on privacy policies to
protect consumers’ interests online. There are problems of inequality of bargaining
power between consumers and OSN providers.293 Even if a large group of consumers
objects to a privacy policy, there are collective action problems. It is often difficult for
consumers to collectively express their privacy preferences to OSN providers.294 Privacy
policies tend to be fairly toothless in practice. These policies are often drafted in vague,
aspirational terms with little serious attempt at making specific representations of exactly
how a user’s privacy will be protected.295 Additionally, privacy policies tend to be
regularly updated unilaterally by OSN providers, thus putting an unrealistic obligation on
users to routinely check back on the policy to keep track of the privacy terms.296 Market
forces may be a useful and important form of regulation. However, market incentives are
often insufficient to effectively protect users’ privacy.297 This may be an area in which it
is necessary for legal rules to interact with market forces to facilitate more appropriate
outcomes.298

D. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
System architecture has been defined as: “technologies for re-creating privacy
where other technologies may have erased it.”299 One salient example of a privacy
protecting architecture is the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) project, which
supports the development of software code that allows websites and Internet users to set
automatic privacy default preferences on their computers that other computers can read
291
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Froomkin, supra note ___, at 1527 (“A more generic problem with self-regulatory schemes, even
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In the associated context of online data aggregation and privacy concerns, Professor Froomkin has
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DIGITAL PERSON, supra note ___, at 97-101.
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without the need for human intervention.300 For example, if a user sets high privacy
settings, her computer might automatically deny access to certain websites that do not
meet those standards. Architecture can have a profound impact on privacy.301 One of its
obvious advantages is that it can be more proactive than many other forms of
regulation.302 It creates ex ante constraints that prevent harm, while laws, for example,
often provide remedies after harms have occurred.303 Nevertheless, the problem with
architecture is that it does not necessarily work well on its own. Privacy-enhancing
technologies can be expensive and there is often little incentive for OSNs to invest in it
absent government regulation requiring them to do so. While there may be incentives for
consumers to invest in privacy-enhacing technologies, many consumers are insufficiently
knowledgeable to work with these technologies. This is where public education plays an
important role in the privacy matrix.304
Some OSNs already do employ privacy-enhancing architectures. A salient
example is the closed network format utilized by Facebook and MySpace. These services
use technology to limit users to accessing information of other users that they are
authorized to access.305 There are other examples where technological solutions may be
implemented to better protect online video privacy. For example, Professors Edwards
and Brown have suggested the possibility of automatic data expiration settings to combat
the permanency problem of digital data in the OSN context.306 Of course, expiration
settings do not automatically deal with the problems of unauthorized dissemination of
images prior to the expiration of the original post, or of the permanence of any copies
made available on other websites. Especially if images have been tagged, they may be
easy to find on multiple websites even after the original image has expired. In fact, with
projects such as the Internet Archive, many images will continue to be available in some
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form even after all “live” images have been removed from relevant websites.307
Nevertheless, automatic expiration settings would, to some extent, limit the availability of
some personal information online. If multiple sites adopted the practice of automatic data
expiration, then even copied images would eventually be removed from multiple sites,
thus potentially lessening the permanency problem.
Technological solutions might also be developed to prevent unauthorized cutting
and pasting of digital video files in the absence of consent by the image holder and the
image subject. Code can be written to prohibit cutting and pasting,308 while at the same
time sending a request to the image holder and image subject for permission to
disseminate the image. The holder and subject could then respond, and that response
could translate into a permission or non-permission to use the image. If a response was
not received from either the image holder or the image subject, the service could simply
refuse permission to copy the image.309 Alternatively, or additionally, the image could be
tagged with permissions when originally uploaded. This would not prevent unauthorized
disseminations of images per se, but it would bring the privacy preferences of the image
subject into public view. Such an approach may assist in online norm development. In
fact, some OSNs are experimenting with these kinds of tags. Facebook has offered
technology to label photographs in order to indicate what groups of people are authorized
to view them.310 However, this system is limited in that the tags are lost when an image is
copied outside the Facebook network.311 To fully protect privacy, tags would have to be
utilized by image subjects as well as owners of online images. This could prove
unwieldy in practice.
This is obviously not a comprehensive survey of technological solutions to video
privacy problems. It is merely intended to establish the availability of technological
options that have not yet been seriously investigated and that might better protect online
privacy. Many technologies that would enable enhanced privacy protection for video
images are in existence today and have yet to be implemented in this context. The failure
to apply them likely has to do with a combination of factors including: (a) assumptions
by some online service providers that users do not care sufficiently about privacy to make
307
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it worth their while to employ these technologies;312 (b) lack of awareness of these
technologies by users; (c) lack of financial incentives for online service providers to
develop and deploy these technologies;313 and, (d) lack of clarity about social norms
regarding online privacy, particularly in the video and multi-media context. Some of the
more obvious advantages of developing technological solutions to emerging privacy
problems are their effectiveness314 and their global reach.315 For example, if OSNs such as
Facebook wanted to better protect privacy on a global scale, it would be a simple matter
for them to create technological privacy defaults that would automatically operate in all
countries where their services were accessible.316

E. EDUCATION
In recent years, commentators have started to focus on new modes of regulation
that may be equally important for online privacy as the four regulatory modalities
discussed above. One example is public education.317 In the context of online privacy,
we should consider who has the responsibility to educate the public, and how prescriptive
or otherwise such education may be.318 If, for example, social norms really are yet to
develop in many online contexts, then education, at least at this point in time, might best
be aimed at generating more of a public dialogue on privacy than on instructing the
public about privacy. On the other hand, the public should certainly be instructed about
currently available privacy-enhancing technologies so that these technologies might be
used more effectively in practice.
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Public education is currently an important, if under-utilized, regulatory modality
for online privacy, both in the video context and with respect to unauthorized uses and
disseminations of personal information more generally. Even if the education component
only consists of explanations about the loss of control people increasingly have over their
personal information online, this might inform the development of social norms. It might
facilitate a situation where Internet users are more cautious about what information they
disclose online, both about themselves and about their friends and acquaintances. The
final regulatory modality addressed here – private or non-profit institutions – potentially
interacts usefully with public education in that many of these institutions can serve an
important public education role.

F. INSTITUTIONS
Another mode of regulating privacy revolves around the recognition of
institutions as privacy regulators.319 In a recent article on the importance of “intellectual
privacy”, Professor Neil Richards utilizes the example of libraries, and in particular, the
American Library Association (ALA) in promoting free speech and intellectual liberty
against the threat of government surveillance.320 He discusses the ALA’s 1939 library bill
of rights which declared aspirations of intellectual freedom and privacy of library
patrons.321 Others have recognized the importance of institutions as regulators in various
online contexts. Professor Lessig, for example, has emphasized the work of non-profit
institutions as a potential regulatory modality in the digital copyright context. He cites
the examples of the Public Library of Science (PLoS)322 and the Creative Commons323 as
non-profit organizations whose work aims to facilitate more effective use of copyright
works for the benefit of society as a whole.324
Institutions can also serve an important role in advocating for law reform. Some
institutions might investigate social norms on issues like privacy, and advocate for
legislation that better reflects those norms. Additionally, some institutions such as the
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EFF325 routinely file amicus briefs in judicial proceedings,326 thus playing into the judicial
side of the regulatory equation. The question for video privacy in the OSN context, and
online privacy generally, is whether there are currently any institutions that could
appropriately fulfill an institutional regulatory function. Because most of the players in
the OSN privacy matrix are commercial enterprises and private Internet users, it is
difficult to identify an analog to the ALA, the PLoS, or Creative Commons in the privacy
context. The closest obvious contenders are some public interest organizations that aim
to protect rights and freedoms online, such as the EFF and the EPIC.327 Other similar
organizations may be developed in the future specifically to take on an institutional role
in protecting privacy online.
These kinds of organizations tend not to be particularly well funded,328 at least as
compared with corporate interests. They certainly do important work in advocating for
the rights of Internet users who may not be able to protect their own individual interests
online because of collective action problems, or lack of knowledge about relevant law
and technology. Perhaps part of the regulatory equation for protecting privacy online
should be to pay more attention to, and encourage funding for, organizations such as the
EFF and EPIC. At the very least, these kinds of institutions can play an important
regulatory role, particularly as public educator and advocate,329 in protecting online
privacy.
Academic institutions are another set of non-profit organizations that can play a
public education role.330 They can assist in developing statements of best practices about
online privacy, as well as disseminating information to the public about these issues.
This is already done through conferences and symposia.331 A greater array of
publications, and greater accessibility of conferences and conference proceedings,
including free online availability,332 could be a useful aspect of the ongoing privacy
matrix. Clearly public education and institutions as regulatory modalities have
significant synergies, and they could be more usefully employed in the future
development of online privacy principles, alongside the other regulatory modalities.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
Privacy has become the object of considerable concern. The purely fortuitous intrusions
inherent in a compact and interrelated society have multiplied. The more insidious
intrusions of increasingly sophisticated scientific devices into previously untouched
areas, and the burgeoning claims of public and private agencies to personal information,
have created a new sense of urgency in defense of privacy.
- Professor Charles Fried333
As evidenced by Professor Fried’s comments from the late 1960s, privacy rights
have been of significant concern since long before the Internet generation. However, the
exponential rise of online privacy-destroying technologies334 has led to increasing
concerns about individual privacy in recent years. The scope and scale of online privacy
violations can be truly devastating, as evidenced by the fate of dog poop girl, Star Wars
kid, and Bus Uncle. A number of regulatory avenues have been identified to better
protect digital privacy. However, the pace of technological change raises significant
challenges for successful regulation. It is now time to start thinking more urgently about
creating a workable matrix of regulatory approaches that better protects online privacy,
particularly with respect to video and multi-media files disseminated online.
One might argue that this article has overstated the case about the need for digital
video privacy regulation. Commentators have suggested that privacy is not a highly held
value in cyberspace335 so there is no need to protect it.336 With respect to OSNs in
particular, some would argue that privacy concerns are a “blip” phenomenon, and that
time will educate Internet users to be more careful about video images and other
information they place online, or allow to be placed online about them.337 However, these
views are problematic for a number of reasons. For one thing, even if current Internet
users’ apparent carelessness about personal information online is temporary, the effects
of this carelessness may be widespread, permanent, and devastating because of the global
and increasingly archival nature of today’s online content.338 Coupled with the
aggregation and contextualization problems identified in Part II, the “blip” of unfortunate
behavior today may have serious long term consequences for many people.

333

Fried, supra note ___, at 475.
Froomkin, supra note ___, at 1468-1501 (detailed survey of modern privacy-destroying
technologies).
335
MILLS, supra note ___, at 187 (“The fact is that current society defines less and less to be private.
People are putting personal information on Web sites, such as MySpace and YouTube, that would be
unthinkable even thirty years ago.”)
336
Goldman, supra note ___ (“mainstream consumers don't change their behavior based on online
privacy concerns. If these people won't take even minimal steps to protect themselves, why should
government regulation do it for them?”).
337
Edwards and Brown, supra note ___, at [page 10-33 of the current draft].
338
CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT
ORGANIZATIONS, 237 (2008) (“An interesting effect of digital archiving is that much casual conversation is
now captured and stored for posterity, so it is possible to look back in time and find simple messages whose
importance becomes obvious only with the passage of time.”)
334

50

Developing a Privacy Paradigm for Digital Video
The Internet fundamentally challenges our perspectives on social, political, and
economic behaviors every decade or so. Each shift requires decision makers to re-think
basic assumptions about human interaction within progressively shorter timeframes.
User-generated content on OSNs is a new crunch point in this online evolution,
particularly as regards privacy. This article has demonstrated that serious privacy harms
can result from unbridled dissemination of video files online. It suggests that it is time to
consider a new multi-modal regulatory approach to protect individual privacy. If we do
not act now, privacy-destroying norms may become entrenched and it will be much more
difficult to protect privacy in the future. Even over-zealous action now can be reined in
later if subsequently found to be overly protective of privacy to the detriment of other
important interests such as free speech. There is little downside to considering regulatory
action to protect privacy. Regulation, imperfect as it may be, can be revised later, but
today’s video privacy incursions may have far-reaching and potentially devastating
consequences.
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